Not Sick Yet:  Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and Barriers to Justiciability by Winters, Diana R.H.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 77 | Issue 3 Article 2
2012
Not Sick Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and
Barriers to Justiciability
Diana R.H. Winters
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Diana R. Winters, Not Sick Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and Barriers to Justiciability, 77 Brook. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol77/iss3/2
905 
Not Sick Yet 
FOOD-SAFETY-IMPACT LITIGATION AND BARRIERS 
TO JUSTICIABILITY 
Diana R. H. Winters† 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States food-safety regulatory program is a 
behemoth. It is overseen by at least five federal agencies 
administering at least six statutes. Yet almost 17 percent of the 
American population (approximately forty-eight million people) 
gets sick from food each year, 128,000 of these people are 
hospitalized, and three thousand die.1 Foodborne illness costs 
the United States over $150 billion per year.2 Food recalls are 
massive and frequent—like that of cantaloupe in 2011, which, 
with approximately thirty deaths from listeria, was the 
deadliest outbreak in almost a century;3 eggs in 2010, where 
  
 † Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston University School of Law. Associate 
Professor, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, as of August 2012. 
J.D., New York University School of Law; Ph.D., Harvard University. I am grateful for 
the comments of Jack M. Beermann, Jay D. Wexler, Abigail R. Moncrieff, Stacey 
Dogan, William E. Nelson, Cecelia Chang, and Ben H. Winters, for the research 
assistance of Crystal Axelrod and Margalit Faden, and for the excellent comments of 
the staff of the Brooklyn Law Review.  
 1 CDC Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-
foodborne-estimates.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2012). This CDC estimate was made 
public in December 2010. Id. The previous estimate was higher—seventy-six million 
people a year getting sick, with five thousand dying. See William Neuman, New 
Estimates of Food Poisoning Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/business/16illness.html?scp=1&sq=cdc%20food%20
poisoning&st=cse. The lowering of the numbers is a result of different calculation 
methods, not an improvement in food safety. Id.  
 2 ROBERT L. SCHARFF, HEALTH-RELATED COSTS FROM FOODBORNE ILLNESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (Produce Safety Project, Georgetown Univ. 2010), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Produce_Safety_Proje
ct/PSP-Scharff%20v9.pdf?n=1136. This study was based on the Center for Disease 
Control’s (CDC) previous estimates of seventy-six million sick Americans a year, and 
therefore would be lower based on the new estimates. Id. The costs include medical 
services, deaths, and lost work and disability. Id. at 2. 
 3 Michael Booth, Cantaloupe Listeria Outbreak Declared Over as One Last 
Death Reported, DENVER POST (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
news/ci_19502146. 
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more than a thousand people were sickened with 
salmonellosis;4 peanut butter in 2009, with over four hundred 
hospitalizations, and at least six deaths;5 and spinach in 2006, 
where 131 people were sickened and over sixty hospitalized.6 
The nation’s food regulatory system is inefficient, 
underenforced, and underfunded. 
Although multiple agencies are responsible for food safety, 
and have overlapping duties, there are wide gaps in oversight and 
regulation.7 The agencies must negotiate the competing goals of 
protecting the public health, marketing the nation’s commodities, 
and appeasing the interests of regulated entities. Compounding 
this problem is a severe shortage of resources allocated to food-
safety enforcement.8 Given the regulatory failures,9 and their 
  
 4 Scott Hensley, Salmonella Cases Rise as Recall of Contaminated Eggs 
Grows, NPR (Aug. 20, 2010, 12:29 p.m.), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/ 
08/20/129321965/salmonella-recalled-egg-contamination. Salmonellosis is an infection 
caused by the bacteria salmonella.  
 5 More Peanut Butter Products Recalled, MSNBC (Jan. 18, 2009, 6:52 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28695782/ns/health-food_safety/.  
 6 Drew Falkenstein, Spinach Recall Among Huffington Post’s Worst Product 
Recalls of All Time, FOOD POISON J. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.foodpoisonjournal.com/ 
2010/02/articles/foodborne-illness-outbreaks/spinach-recall-among-huffington-posts-worst-
product-recalls-of-all-time/. 
 7 Broadly conceived, food safety covers three areas: (1) the prevention of 
foodborne illness; (2) nutrition monitoring; and (3) the prevention of fraud in the 
marketplace. This article only addresses the first category, although there is overlap 
amongst the three. For example, I do not discuss cases regarding deceptive claims or 
fraudulent labeling, such as those brought in recent years by the Center for Science in 
the Public Interest (CSPI), although they certainly concern food safety. See, e.g., 
Amended Complaint at 1-2, 29, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp., No. CGC-10-506178 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/mcdonald_ 
scomplaint.pdf (CSPI’s McDonald’s litigation charges McDonald’s with unfair and 
deceptive marketing for including toys in Happy Meals); Complaint at 2-3, Ackerman 
v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09-CV-0395 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2009), available at 
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/vitaminwater_filed_complaint.pdf (CSPI’s VitaminWater 
litigation charges Coca-Cola with fraudulent marketing for including claims of 
healthfulness on its VitaminWater products).  
 8 See, e.g., William Neuman, On Food Safety, a Long List but Little Money, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/business/with-a-long-list-and-short-
on-money-fda-tackles-food-safety.html?scp=5&sq=%22food%20safety%22%20fund&st=cse. 
 9 The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), signed by the President on 
January 4, 2011, addresses some of the problems with the regulatory system. It provides 
more power, and, theoretically, more funding to the Food and Drug Administration for its 
food-safety duties, and changes the food-safety focus of the agency from responsive to 
preventative. See Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 
(2011). It does not, however, address the inefficiencies or inconsistencies caused by the 
fact that multiple agencies have authority over food regulation, nor does it alter the fact 
that the agencies have political imperatives, see, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference 
in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of 
Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 962-72 (2008), and, in some instances, must balance 
the competing goals of economic viability of food production with the public health. See, 
e.g., Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/ 
usdahome?navid=MISSION_STATEMENT (last modified Oct. 29, 2009). 
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significant public health consequences, it is imperative to discuss 
alternatives to regulation as a means to improve the food-safety 
system in this country.  
Advocacy group litigation can complement agency 
regulation in the field of food safety. And, just as such litigation 
enhances the enforcement of environmental laws, so too can 
advocacy group litigation add an element of “attentive 
monitoring” to food-safety statutes.10 This paper provides, for 
the first time, a comprehensive examination of advocacy group 
litigation, or food-safety-impact litigation,11 in the food-safety 
context, assessing its viability and utility.  
In evaluating the potential efficacy of food-safety-impact 
litigation, this paper puts particular focus on the barriers to 
justiciability that such litigation faces,12 including standing 
challenges and justiciability issues under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.13 These threshold issues are particularly 
important here because plaintiffs in advocacy group litigation are 
not the direct objects of the regulation they target14 and because 
the injury to which they point is often an increased risk of future 
harm.15 Although the environmental laws contain structural legal 
elements, such as citizen-suit provisions and consultative 
arrangements, which food-safety laws do not, the absence of such 
  
 10 William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. 
Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1019-21 
(1994). Rodgers explains that “attentive monitoring,” which contributes to the success 
of certain seminal environmental laws, comprises “personal activities such as face-to-
face observation, emotions such as shame and pride, and group sanctions such as 
ostracism and citizen lawsuits.” Id. at 1020. He notes that these mechanisms are 
encouraged by structural legal changes. Id.  
 11 This article defines food-safety-impact litigation as suits brought against 
food-safety regulatory agencies to improve the regulatory scheme for the purpose of 
protecting the public health in general and the plaintiff’s own health in particular. 
Impact litigation may be brought, for example, to contest an allegedly arbitrary and 
capricious denial of an administrative petition, or to argue that a final agency action 
was unreasonable. 
 12 I confine my discussion here to cases brought by individuals or entities against 
regulatory agencies for the purpose of forcing the agency to comply with its statutory 
mandate by either passing regulation, or interpreting existing regulations differently.  
 13 Food-safety litigants suing private parties under state law or suing state 
government to enforce or strengthen state regulation must also negotiate federal 
preemption doctrine. Preemption issues, however, do not arise in litigation against the 
federal government, for obvious reasons, and I therefore leave a discussion of 
preemption issues to another paper. 
 14 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
 15 Impact litigation in the field of food safety is brought before an outbreak of 
foodborne illness, and seeks stronger regulation to prevent or minimize the chance of 
such an outbreak. For that reason, such litigation must be based on probabilities—the 
plaintiffs argue that it is x percent more likely that an outbreak of foodborne illness 
will take place with the current state of regulation than with the requested regulation. 
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provisions is not an insurmountable barrier to impact litigation.16 
Thus despite these justiciability challenges, food-safety-impact 
suits are possible to bring, and possible to win. 
Why, then, is there so little food-safety-impact 
litigation? Essentially, the answer is that there is no culture of 
citizen food-safety litigation, as there is for environmental-
impact litigation. The environmental bar has spent decades 
learning to litigate around the justiciability barriers discussed 
in this paper, and courts have adapted many of these doctrines 
for the environmental context.17 But there is no food protection 
community practiced in the art of litigation against agency 
action and inaction.  
For food-safety-impact litigation to be successful it must 
be modeled after environmental litigation. The doctrines 
developed by environmental-impact litigation provide an 
avenue for successful pre-illness food-safety litigation. Both 
food-safety and environmental-impact litigation depend on 
probabilities and involve great uncertainty. Governmental 
regulation of this uncertainty involves a negotiation of risk, 
cost-benefit analysis, public perception, and political reality. 
Both the environmental laws and the food-safety laws envision 
a joint state-federal system of enforcement. Moreover, the 
injury stemming from environmental or food-safety harms is 
likely to be widely shared, yet particularized. For this reason, 
the few courts that have actually dealt with food-safety-impact 
litigation look to environmental litigation as a backdrop,18 and 
mechanisms developed by litigants to maneuver environmental 
  
 16 I have spoken with several lawyers at public interest organizations who 
confirmed my inclination that food-safety cases can be successful. For example, Allison 
Zieve, the director of Public Citizen’s Litigation Group, told me that these cases were no 
longer generated by anyone at her organization, and that she would be willing to consider 
such suits if litigable issues were brought to her attention. Telephone Interview with 
Allison Zieve, Dir., Pub. Citizen Litig. Grp. (Jan. 28, 2011) (notes on file with the author). 
I spoke with a former Associate Chief Counsel of the FDA, who asked not to be named, 
who told me that during his tenure at the FDA, which was during George W. Bush’s 
administration, several of his colleagues and he wished there had been citizen litigation 
against the FDA. During these years, he explained, the agency was market oriented 
instead of food-safety oriented, and he felt that citizen litigation could have forced the 
agency’s hand as to certain regulatory issues in the food-safety field. 
  Indeed the food-safety-impact litigation that does exist has a more than 
respectable success rate—out of thirteen cases, plaintiffs achieved at least some of 
their requested relief in three of the cases, and a fourth case was mooted when the 
agency adopted plaintiff’s position during pendency of the suit. 
 17 See Va. State Corp. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 468 F.3d 
845, 847-49 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 18 See, e.g., Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003); Levine v. 
Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at 
*14-31 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006). 
2012] NOT SICK YET 909 
litigation past justiciability barriers are both necessary and 
useful for food-safety litigation.  
This article begins a discussion of the parameters and 
implications of food-safety citizen and advocacy group 
litigation. Moreover, this article provides an added perspective 
on the need for courts to adapt traditional barriers to 
justiciability to the realities of litigation that involves injuries 
based on the possibility of future harm and the increase in risk 
associated thereof. Food safety involves issues on the frontier of 
regulation, including the need to address the role of lifestyle 
choice in conjunction with public health, and the need to 
regulate a massive system involving minutely local as well as 
global elements. Moreover, issues about food are increasingly 
in the forefront of public awareness. The understanding that 
advocacy-group litigation is possible and can be successful may 
be a valuable tool for this burgeoning movement. 
Any expansion of the regulatory state carries challenges 
to its scope and authority as a counterpart to its growth. These 
challenges come both from proponents and opponents of 
regulation.19 As noted above, public challenges to the regulatory 
system will confront obstacles to litigation, as courts attempt to 
negotiate their role vis-à-vis this public litigation. Justiciability 
issues will be at the forefront of much public litigation in the 
coming years. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the 
structure of the United States food regulatory system, and 
looks at some of the problems with agency enforcement and 
nonlegal sanctions. Part II discusses the absence of a culture of 
food-safety-impact litigation, addressing the nature of food and 
the divergent paths that environmental protection and food-
safety regulation have taken in the United States. Part III 
turns to the justiciability barriers that food-safety-impact 
plaintiffs will face, and have faced in the few already litigated 
cases, focusing on constitutional and prudential standing 
issues, and reviewability challenges under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. This section concludes with an analysis of how 
food-safety citizen plaintiffs can successfully navigate the 
justiciability challenges they are sure to face. Finally, the 
  
 19 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 
F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2009) (public interest group and union challenge Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation for its underregulation of 
hexavalent chromium; industry group challenges the same regulation for its 
overregulation of same chemical). 
910 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
article concludes that, under certain circumstances, citizen 
litigation can be a valuable counterpart to government 
regulation and spur regulatory agencies to fulfill their 
statutory mandates. Food-safety regulation, like environmental 
regulation, is a massive endeavor involving many agencies, 
statutes, regulated entities, and beneficiaries, and requiring 
vast resources. As citizen advocacy groups have acted as a 
counterpart to government regulation in the environmental 
arena, so could they be useful in the field of food safety. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES FOOD 
REGULATORY SYSTEM 
A. The Regulatory Structure of Food Safety 
Food safety is mainly overseen by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), although several other agencies play a part as well.20 
Government regulation of food has historically had three main 
purposes: (1) to protect the integrity of the market; (2) to 
regulate the nutritional content of food; and (3) to protect the 
safety of the food supply.21 Although there is overlap among the 
three goals, the topic of this paper—impact litigation to 
minimize the threat of foodborne illness—is mostly contained 
within the third.22  
The FDA has authority under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) over most food products except meat, 
poultry, and processed egg products.23 The FFDCA, passed in 
  
 20 The Environmental Protection Agency regulates drinking water and 
pesticide residues; the Federal Trade Commission shares jurisdiction over advertising; 
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau regulates alcohol; the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention tracks foodborne illness; the National Marine 
Fisheries Service helps regulate fish and seafood products; the Customs Service 
regulates imported foods; and the Department of Justice prosecutes individuals and 
companies for violations of food-safety statutes. See NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD 
REGULATION 24-27 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2009).  
 21 Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of the Integrity of the Food 
Supply, 4 ANN. REV. NUTRITION 1, 2 (1984). 
 22 Protecting the food supply includes more than the prevention of foodborne 
illness. It can also involve measures to prevent external security threats, for example, 
intentional poisoning of the food supply, which I do not discuss in this article. See, e.g., Armen 
Keteyian, Latest Terror Threat in U.S. Aimed to Poison Food, CBS NEWS (Dec. 20, 2010, 
11:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/20/eveningnews/main7169266.shtml. 
Additionally, steps taken to protect the food supply may also protect the integrity of the 
market, and vice versa.  
 23 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-2252 (2006). The FDA does have authority, however, over 
imported wild game. See Fact Sheets: Meat Preparation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
 
2012] NOT SICK YET 911 
1938, updated the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act.24 It has been 
substantially amended since 1938, but still retains its basic 
structure.25 The 1938 FFDCA has been described as “a catalogue 
of definitions elaborating two basic concepts: ‘adulteration’ and 
‘misbranding.’”26 The Act specifies when a food (or drug device or 
cosmetic) is adulterated or misbranded, and prohibits the 
distribution or sale of any such food.27 
To enforce the FFDCA, the FDA has authority to 
institute various administrative, civil, or criminal actions. It 
can issue warning letters, request a voluntary recall of an 
adulterated product, order recalls under certain circumstances, 
seize products that violate the Act,28 assess civil penalties,29 and 
work with the Department of Justice to take court action.30 
The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, signed into 
law in January 2011, is the biggest reform of the FDA’s food 
regulatory powers since 1938, and its implementation will 
reorient the FDA to take a preventative rather than a 
responsive role regarding food safety.31 The Act amends the 
FFDCA to, among other things, give the FDA: (a) mandatory 
recall authority;32 (b) expanded authority to inspect records;33 
and (c) the authority to suspend the registration of a food 
facility.34 The Act also requires owners and operators of food 
  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Factsheets/Farm_Raised_Game/index.asp#4 (last modified 
May 27, 2011).  
 24 Hutt, supra note 21, at 7. 
 25 PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD 
AND DRUG LAW 14 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2007).  
 26 Id. at 13. 
 27 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 342, 343. 
 28 Id. §§ 334, 350a(f)(2); FORTIN, supra note 20, at 510; see also Inspections, 
Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last updated 
Feb. 8, 2012). 
 29 21 U.S.C. § 335b. 
 30 Id. § 337. 
 31 Certain provisions in the Act, such as the mandatory recall provisions, take 
effect immediately, while the FDA must write rules to implement other provisions of the 
Act. See Helena Bottemiller, Q & A with Michael Taylor, Part I: Implementing FSMA, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/01/qa-with-michael-
tayor-part-1-implementing-fsma/. Implementation of the Act’s provisions and the FDA’s 
expanded powers also rests on whether adequate funding is provided by Congress, an 
issue that is in question. See Lyndsey Layton, Overhaul of Food Safety Laws May Not 
Be to GOP’s Taste, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/24/AR2010122402795.html.  
 32 S. 510, 111th Cong. § 206 (2010) (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 33 Id. § 101 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 350c(a)).  
 34 Id. § 102(b) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 350d(a)).  
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facilities to evaluate the hazards that could affect food,35 and 
implement and monitor preventative controls.36 Imported food 
will have to meet the same standards.37 The FDA is also 
directed to increase inspections of domestic and foreign 
facilities, directing resources to the riskiest facilities.38 
The USDA shares authority over food safety with the 
FDA. Its Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) has authority 
over meat, poultry, processed egg products, and egg grading,39 
and it regulates products related to meat and poultry, 
including stews, pizzas, and frozen foods. The major food-safety 
statutes administered by the USDA are the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act (FMIA), passed in 190640 and amended in 1967 
by the Wholesome Meat Act;41 the Poultry Products Inspection 
Act (PPIA);42 and the Egg Products Inspection Act (EPIA).43 The 
FSIS, like the FDA, can issue warning letters and seize 
products under the FMIA and the PPIA.44  
Unlike food producers under the authority of the FDA,45 
however, meat-and-poultry producing establishments must 
have a USDA inspector present whenever they are operating.46 
Much of the FSIS’s power over the food supply for which it is 
responsible stems from its ability to take a regulatory control 
action in relation to its inspection authority. Such actions 
include “the retention of product, rejection of equipment or 
facilities, slowing or stopping of lines, or refusal to allow the 
processing of specifically-identified product.”47 FSIS can also 
withhold a mark of federal inspection (without which a product 
  
 35 Facilities will have to implement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) protocols, which the USDA has required of meat and poultry facilities 
since 2003. See, e.g., Control of Listeria Monocytogenes in Ready-to-Eat Meat and 
Poultry Products, 9 C.F.R. § 430.4 (2003).  
 36 S. 510, 111th Cong. § 103 (2010) (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 37 Id. §§ 301-309 (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 38 Id. §§ 201-211 (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 39 About FSIS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/index.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).  
 40 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6. 
 41 21 U.S.C. §§ 610-611 (2006); FORTIN, supra note 20, at 29.  
 42 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-472. 
 43 Id. §§ 1031-1056. 
 44 Id. §§ 673, 467b. 
 45 This may change, in that the FSMA directs the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish regulations concerning 
inspections for facilities under its authority. S. 510, 111th Cong. § 201 (2010).  
 46 9 C.F.R. § 302.3 (2010); FORTIN, supra note 20, at 567 (“FSIS inspects meat 
and poultry under a ‘continuous inspection’ system, which means that an inspector is 
assigned to every FSIS-regulated establishment and is required to be present when the 
establishment is in operation.”). 
 47 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 568. 
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cannot be distributed or sold), or suspend inspection at a 
certain facility.48 If inspections are suspended at a facility, the 
facility must stop operating until the USDA reinstitutes 
inspections.49 If a grant of federal inspection is withdrawn, a 
facility must cease operations completely.50 
B. Enforcement Shortcomings 
Notwithstanding the imposing regulatory structure 
built to oversee food safety, and the recent enactment of the 
FSMA, our food regulatory system is falling short for several 
reasons. First, the bifurcation of major food regulatory duties 
between the FDA and the USDA results in inefficiencies, 
inconsistencies, and even some absurdities.51 For an oft-
repeated example, pizza is regulated by the FDA unless it has 
a topping of more than 2 percent of cooked meat or poultry, in 
which case the USDA is in charge.52 For this reason, pizza 
production facilities are often regulated by both agencies.53 
Redundant oversight is clearly inefficient. But more 
dangerous to the consuming public is the possibility of 
inconsistency in the agencies’ regulatory regimes. For example, 
eggs are subject to a baffling array of regulations and regulatory 
oversight, the result of which leaves gaps in food-safety 
enforcement.54 Eggs were responsible for approximately 75 
  
 48 9 C.F.R. § 500.1-2.  
 49 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 513. 
 50 Id. at 514. 
 51 Consolidation of agency responsibilities, an often touted solution, is not 
only politically inviable at this time, but also may not actually fix the problems. See, 
e.g., Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn’t Enough?, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2007) [hereinafter Reforming the Food Safety System]. 
 52 See Investigation Operations Manual, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/ucm127390.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 53 Reforming the Food Safety System, supra note 51, at 1350 (citing INST. OF 
MED. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD: FROM PRODUCTION TO 
CONSUMPTION 85 (1998)).  
 54 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES, FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY OVERSIGHT (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11289.pdf (“FDA is generally responsible for ensuring that eggs in their 
shells—referred to as shell eggs—including eggs at farms such as those where the 
outbreak occurred, are safe, wholesome, and properly labeled. FSIS, on the other hand, 
is responsible for the safety of eggs processed into egg products. In addition, USDA’s 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) sets quality and grade standards for shell eggs, 
such as Grade A, but does not test the eggs for bacteria such as Salmonella. Further, 
while USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service manages the program that 
helps ensure laying hens are free from Salmonella at birth, FDA oversees the safety of 
the feed they eat.”). 
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percent of all salmonella outbreaks between 1985 and 199855—
although this percentage may be dropping due to a new egg-safety 
rule promulgated by the FDA in 200956—and the country was 
reminded of their potential dangerousness during the massive 
2010 egg recall. There is also the possibility of inconsistency 
within one agency’s regulation of different products. For example, 
in one of the suits discussed below, poultry consumers sued the 
USDA over what they contended was irrationally inconsistent 
treatment of meat and poultry.57 
Funding for food safety is also a problem. The Center for 
Science in the Public Interest has noted that “[s]ince 1972, 
inspections conducted by the FDA declined 81 percent. Since 
2003, the number of FDA field staff dropped by 12 percent, and 
between 2003 and 2006 federal inspections dropped by 47 
percent.”58 Although meat and poultry account for less 
foodborne illness than do seafood and fresh produce, which are 
regulated by the FDA, the USDA spends significantly more 
money on food safety than does the FDA.59 Moreover, the FDA 
will not be able to implement the inspections mandated by the 
Food Safety Modernization Act if Congress withholds funding, 
as it has threatened to do.60  
Finally, there is a perception that both the FDA and the 
USDA are subject to agency capture, whereby regulated 
entities exert such an influence over their regulators that they 
essentially control the agencies, at the expense of the intended 
beneficiaries of the regulatory system.61 The prevalence of such 
  
 55 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-99-184, FOOD SAFETY: U.S. 
LACKS A CONSISTENT FARM-TO-TABLE APPROACH TO EGG SAFETY 3-4 (1999), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-99-184.  
 56 Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 
Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,030 (July 9, 2009). 
 57 See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.  
 58 Keep America’s Food Safe: The Case for Increased Funding at the FDA, 
CENTER FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INT., http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/fdafunding.html 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
 59 See Helena Bottemiller, Obama Boosts FDA Food Safety in FY2011 
Budget, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/ 
02/obama-boosts-food-safety-in-fy2011-budget/. 
 60 See, e.g., Molly Peterson, Food-Safety Funding Battle Looms as Obama 
Prepares to Sign Reform Bill, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-04/food-safety-funding-battle-looms-as-obama-
prepares-to-sign-reform-bill.html. 
 61 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2, 8 
n.32 (2010); William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1590-91 (2007) (“Agencies may be able 
to secure expanded budgets or even engage in outright favoritism to affected industry in 
exchange for the usual rewards of regulatory capture—electoral support for the 
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an industry viewpoint in the FDA and the USDA may produce 
lax enforcement and a reliance on industry self-regulation, 
even when it may not be the best approach for the public.62 This 
phenomenon can be explicit, where there is an actual flow of 
individuals between industry and decision-making regulatory 
positions, or implicit, which involves more attenuated but no 
less real connections between decision makers and industry.63 
Under some circumstances, citizen-impact litigation can 
address some of these regulatory shortcomings and be a useful 
counterpart to government regulation. 
  
administration in power, revolving doors from agencies to industry, and a reduced risk of 
embarrassment that might result from more adversarial modes of regulatory exchange.”). 
 62 For example, the mission statement of the USDA contains a provision that 
makes such industry pressure a mandate, rather than an eventuality—the agency is 
charged both with expanding and protecting agricultural markets, as well as enhancing food 
safety. Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 9. While in theory prevention of 
foodborne illness is entirely consistent with improving the economics of agriculture, the 
USDA’s main priority is split between economic development and public health. For another 
example, the New York Times recently reported that the USDA was assisting in the marketing 
of cheese, while simultaneously discouraging its consumption in an anti-obesity campaign. 
Michael Moss, While Warning About Fat, U.S. Pushes Cheese Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/us/07fat.html?scp=1&sq=domino+ 
cheese&st=nyt.  
  As to the FDA, there is much scholarship on the effect that industry pressure 
has had on the FDA’s nutrition policy. See generally Emily J. Schaffer, Is the Fox Guarding 
the Henhouse? Who Makes the Rules in American Nutrition Policy?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
371 (2002) (collecting scholarship). And, regarding food safety, until the FSMA was passed, 
the FDA relied on voluntary recall for adulterated products. Market incentives support such 
a policy because industry is invested in the public perception of the safety of its products. 
Nevertheless, voluntary recall power does not remedy industry reluctance to insure the 
safety of its own food. See, e.g., Miriam Falco, FDA: Peanut Plant Knew Product Was 
Tainted with Salmonella, CNN (Jan. 28, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-01-28/health/ 
salmonella.outbreak_1_peanut-corporation-salmonella-typhimurium-peanut-plant?_s= 
PM:HEALTH (Peanut Corporation of America shipped product it knew was tainted with 
salmonella). The FSMA does give the FDA mandatory recall authority, although recalls are 
still reactionary rather than precautionary. 
 63 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the 
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006). The question of whether 
agency capture is actually a problem, or more a perceived problem, and the effects 
thereof, has been amply discussed in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, 
Capture Theory and the Courts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, 
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 163, 183-84 (1992-93); see also Bagley & Revesz, supra, at 1284-92 (arguing that 
the theory of regulatory capture does not adequately explain the reality of 
governmental agency processes).  
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II. THE ABSENCE OF AN IMPACT LITIGATION CULTURE IN 
THE CONTEXT OF FOOD SAFETY 
Food-safety-impact litigation, however, is rare. Over the 
last forty years, fewer than twenty published cases fall into 
this category.64 
  
 64 I searched for cases by citizens or organizational plaintiffs against the 
government seeking to change regulation for the stated purpose of improving public 
health, as well as state and federal cases brought against the USDA, HHS, or the FDA 
since 1970 that concerned food safety, and found the following fourteen cases: Levine v. 
Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009) (citizens brought suit against Secretary of 
Agriculture challenging rule excluding poultry from Humane Methods of Slaughter 
Act; Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of Article III standing; discussed, infra Part 
III.B.2); Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. USDA, 
499 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (trade organization challenged USDA regulation of the 
importation of Canadian cattle; court deferred to agency; discussed, infra Part III.B.3); 
Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2003) (citizen sued USDA to challenge refusal 
to prohibit downed cattle from entering food supply; Second Circuit found standing; 
discussed, infra Part III.B.1); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Veneman, 284 
F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (organizations representing government employees 
challenged a new provisional inspection system instituted by the USDA of meat and 
poultry carcasses; court ultimately found that this new, but provisional and temporary 
system was adequate; standing not discussed); Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (poultry consumers and red meat producers challenged alleged 
inconsistencies between regulation of meat and poultry; court found case reviewable 
under APA; discussed in detail, infra Part III.C); Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (consumer and public interest groups challenged labeling of raw fish and 
produce; court found FDA’s industry standard to be reasonable); Simpson v. Young, 854 
F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (consumer advocacy public interest group challenged FDA 
conclusion that a certain color additive was safe; court deferred to agency decision); 
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (public interest groups 
and consumers sued the FDA for its promulgation of “action levels” instead of formal 
tolerance levels for aflatoxins, a carcinogen, in corn; after the United States Supreme 
Court decided tolerance levels were not necessary, Court of Appeals found the action 
levels nevertheless needed to be promulgated pursuant to notice and comment 
rulemaking; standing conceded “under the broad grant of standing” found in the 
FFDCA and the APA); Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Bergland, 631 F.2d 1353 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (trade organizations representing pork producers and meat packers 
challenged new USDA regulations allowing certain products not cured with nitrates 
(such as hot dogs) to be sold under their traditional names; court found regulation 
valid); Pub. Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (consumer advocacy 
public interest group sought declaratory judgment that nitrites were an unsafe food 
additive; court held that nitrites fell under the prior sanction exception to FDA 
responsibility; discussed infra note 162); Am. Pub. Health Assoc. v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (public health advocacy organization sued Secretary of Agriculture for 
allegedly violating the Wholesome Meat Act and the Wholesome Poultry Products Act 
by refusing to affix safe handling instructions to raw meat and poultry; court held that 
labels as currently written were not false and misleading); Schuck v. Butz, 500 F.2d 
810 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citizen sued the Secretary of Agriculture seeking repeal of 
regulations permitting the use of nitrates and nitrites in meat products; court held that 
appellants had to petition for a rulemaking); Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229 
(D.D.C. 1987) (consumer advocacy public interest group petitioned HHS for rule 
banning interstate sales of raw milk; court agreed with petitioners; discussed in detail, 
infra Part III.C); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 632 F. Supp. 220 
(D.D.C. 1986) (consumer advocacy public interest group challenged provisional listing 
of nine color additives as safe for use; court held the listing to be consistent with 
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The paucity of citizen suits is not explained by the lack 
of citizen-suit provisions in the statutes regulating food safety,65 
nor by the absence of a private right of action under the 
FFDCA,66 the FMIA,67 or the PPIA.68 A viable alternative for 
plaintiffs is to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), which prescribes procedural safeguards and establishes 
judicial review over federal regulatory agencies.69 And although 
such litigation will, and does, confront justiciability barriers—
including challenges to standing and to the suits’ justiciability 
under the APA—these barriers are surmountable. Food-safety 
citizen litigation can be brought, and can be won, as 
demonstrated by prior cases. 
This is not to minimize the advantage that a statutory 
citizen-suit provision provides a plaintiff. Citizen-suit 
provisions generally permit “any person” to sue certain 
persons, including government officials, who violate certain 
legal obligations, or who fail to carry out nondiscretionary 
duties.70 Judicial review over agency decision making is 
  
human health, not unreasonably delayed under the APA, and the Delaney Clause 
challenge to be unripe). In all probability there are other such cases I could not find, 
and which most likely were dismissed at an early stage for lack of final agency action, 
or a similar procedural problem.  
  I did not include here a citizen suit challenging the FDA’s decision to allow the 
use of certain color additive dyes in external cosmetic use, because cosmetics are not food. 
Nevertheless this suit involved an interpretation of the Delaney Clause, which prohibits the 
listing of color additives, ingested or not, if they are found to induce cancer in man or 
animal, and thus affects food safety. The citizen suit in this case was successful, in that the 
court determined that the FDA’s reading of the Delaney Clause to permit a de minimis 
exception was unreasonable, and that the dyes therefore needed to be delisted. Pub. Citizen 
v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nor did I include the private litigation that CSPI 
has been involved in, although this certainly touches on food safety.  
 65 See Poultry and Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-472 (2006); 
Federal Meat Inspection Act, Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2006).  
 66 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 806-07 (1986). 
 67 See Mario’s Butcher Shop & Food Ctr., Inc. v. Armour & Co., 574 F. Supp. 
653, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
 68 See Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 308 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2002) (Poultry 
Products Inspection Act provides no private right of action). 
 69 Section 702 of the APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 
(2006). Suits under this provision of the APA cannot be brought for money damages, but 
only for declaratory or injunctive relief, and must challenge “agency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a 
court.” Id. § 704. Section 701 carves out two exceptions to judicial reviewability: (1) when 
“statutes preclude judicial review”; or (2) when “agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.” Id. § 701. Litigants bringing suit under section 702 of the APA must 
still meet constitutional and prudential standing requirements, including demonstrating 
injury in fact and meeting the zone of interests test, both described below. 
 70 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006). 
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limited,71 and courts may be reluctant to delve too deeply into 
an agency’s decision-making processes, especially if the 
decision at issue contains technical or scientific aspects.72 
Whereas a plaintiff suing under a citizen-suit provision must 
show a violation of legal obligations under the relevant statute 
to win, a plaintiff suing pursuant to the APA must show that 
the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious.73 But, as the 
presence of a citizen-suit provision does not guarantee a 
plaintiff’s ability to bring suit, in that he or she must still 
satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of 
Article III, neither does the absence of such a provision 
foreclose food-safety-impact litigation.  
Citizen-suit provisions also provide for attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party.74 Although it may be possible for litigants 
against the federal government to be awarded fees and costs 
under other statutory provisions,75 it is unrealistic to think that 
organizations dedicated to food safety and committed to impact 
litigation would rely on attorney-fee provisions for their 
survival in any event. Consider environmental organizations 
dedicated to impact litigation. Although the availability of 
attorney’s fees may assist in perpetuating organizations 
funding environmental-impact litigation, these fees are not 
necessary to the survival of these groups, nor are they the focus 
of litigation. These organizations are instead sustained through 
private donations and grants.76 Notably, environmental-impact 
litigation began before the passage of environmental legislation 
containing citizen-suit provisions.77  
  
 71 See 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 72 See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and 
Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011). 
 73 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 74 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act). 
 75 See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006) (allowing 
fees against the federal government “unless the court finds that the position of the 
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award 
unjust.”); see also Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a coalition of fresh potato producers, which was the prevailing party in its 
litigation against the FDA regarding a regulation, was entitled to fees under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act). 
 76 William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 
231 (Foundation Press 2005). 
 77 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 
608 (2d Cir. 1965). The Natural Resource Defense Council began its environmental 
litigation work before the environmental laws were passed, sometimes using century-
old statutes. See JOHN H. ADAMS & ET AL., A FORCE FOR NATURE 53 (Chronicle Books 
2010) (describing NRDC litigation regarding stream channelization, brought pursuant 
to the 1899 Refuse Act). 
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Food safety significantly overlaps with environmental 
protection. Beyond the actual commonalities between the two 
subjects—i.e., more responsible stewardship of land will lead to 
a safer food supply; cleaner agriculture and husbanding 
practices result in cleaner land—both food safety and 
environmental protection involve compulsory and 
comprehensive participatory systems. Everyone has to breathe 
the air, drink the water, live on the earth, and somehow 
nourish themselves. Beyond that, of course, individual 
discretion exists as to where, how, and what, although the 
extent of this individual discretion varies according to 
numerous demographic factors. 
There are certain key differences between food safety 
and environmental protection, however, which have led to a 
vigorous impact litigation culture in the context of 
environmental law, and a virtual absence of one in the context 
of food safety. These differences include: (a) the nature of food 
versus that of the environment, and (b) the disparate historical 
development of (i) the regulatory structures overlaying the 
food-safety system and the management of the environment, 
and (ii) the advocacy movements concerned with issues 
touching on food safety and with issues regarding 
environmental protection.  
A. The Nature of Food 
Although both food and the environment involve 
compulsory systems, an individual’s relationship with each 
system is quite different. To begin with, there is no seemingly 
helpless entity in the food-safety context that needs an 
advocate on its behalf. Since its proposal in a law review article 
by Christopher Stone in 1972, and its citation in Justice 
Douglas’s dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, the concept of trees 
and rocks having standing to sue in American law is a concept 
that, although repeatedly mocked, has had remarkable 
resilience and has even been recently revived.78 It is argued 
that, if inanimate objects and spaces cannot protect themselves 
in court, it stands to reason that advocates are needed to 
  
 78 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). On recent revival of the idea, see Noaki Schwartz, 
Effort May Give Birds, Bees, Trees Legal Standing, SFGATE.COM (Dec. 4, 2010), 
http://boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2010/12/04/effort_may_give_birds_bees_trees_leg
al_standing/ (describing recent community ordinances giving nature legal standing). 
920 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
represent them. No one, however, has argued that a tomato 
needs standing. Food itself is not perceived as requiring 
protection outside of its relationship to the human consumer. A 
consumer may choose to protect his consumption based on 
numerous factors—religious, cultural, economic, and health—
but the food supply has no independent moral content. An 
exception to this is the prevention of animal cruelty, which is 
invested with a moral value beyond the consumption of 
animals by humans, and there is a vigorous tradition of 
advocacy surrounding the prevention of animal cruelty. The 
American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was 
founded in 1866, a quarter century before the founding of the 
Sierra Club. Animal welfare organizations have, in fact, 
brought a significant amount of the small body of existing food-
safety impact cases. 
Moreover, environmental protection is about the 
protection of physical space. Pre-harm environmental litigation 
is focused on protecting a particular space, whether it is an 
individual’s home, or somewhere imbued with environmental 
value.79 Geographic proximity to the area at issue allows a court 
a measurable index to assess actual injury.80  
Real property holds a unique and exalted place in 
American history and the American psyche, and consequently, 
in American law. The narrative of development in this country is 
one of territorial conquest, and the closing of the United States 
frontier in 1890 was a significant event.81 Property ownership 
has long been an American success symbol, fostered by 
governmental policies supporting homeownership.82 The law also 
  
 79 See, e.g., Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728 (action by the Sierra Club to prevent 
recreational development in the Sequoia National Forest); Forest Voice, LLC v. Town of 
Forest, Civ. Action No. 11-CV-100, U.S. Dist. Ct., Western District of Wisconsin, complaint 
filed Feb. 9, 2011, available at http://articles.law360.s3.amazonaws.com/0224000/ 
224907/ee.pdf (citizens sued an energy company over plans to build a wind turbine system 
in their town). Even pre-harm Endangered Species Act litigation concerns habitat 
protection. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).  
 80 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 181-82 (2000). 
 81 See, e.g., FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, HISTORY, FRONTIER, AND SECTION 
(University of New Mexico Press 1993). Turner claimed that the frontier was the most 
important force in American society, culture, and politics, and that its disappearance 
would gravely affect the national character and mindset. 
 82 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006) (provision of the Internal Revenue Code 
allowing a home mortgage interest deduction). Of course, the emphasis on home buying 
has come under scrutiny since the housing crisis. Binyamin Appelbaum, Administration 
Calls for Cutting Aid to Home Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/business/12housing.html?scp=2&sq=housing+crisis+
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treats property uniquely, above and beyond necessity. For 
example, if a court, either state or federal, takes jurisdiction over 
real property, it may be able to enjoin any other court from 
continuing adjudication of the same property.83 Although the 
underlying policy reason behind this—to avoid inconsistent 
determinations over the same piece of property—is logical, it 
does not explain the absence of such safeguards over other 
adjudicatory subjects, such as bank accounts, where inconsistent 
judgments would carry the same detrimental consequences.84  
On the other hand, food is largely divorced from its 
origin—distributed and packaged as uniformly as possible so as to 
disguise any indication of where it is from. One of the hallmarks 
of our country’s food distribution system is its centralization, and 
the inability to trace the origins of much of the domestic food 
supply is one of the obstacles to minimizing the effect of foodborne 
illness outbreaks.85 Acknowledging this, the Food Safety 
Modernization Act includes a provision that enhances the 
capacity of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to trace 
food items for the purpose of improving the capacity of the 
government to detect and respond to food-safety problems.86 
The significance of food’s ubiquity and non-fixedness is 
threefold. First, it may be difficult for courts to analogize to 
environmental law in finding particularized injury to fulfill 
Article III standing requirements for food-safety impact 
litigants because there is no analog to the category of 
geographic proximity. Second, food is seen as more fungible 
than pieces of land. If a consumer believes that the regulatory 
scheme overlaying a particular food product is unlawfully 
inadequate, he may choose another comestible, whereas a 
homeowner who believes an environmental agency is acting 
unlawfully may have no recourse but to sell her property. This 
may lead to decreased incentive to litigate for stronger 
  
home+buying&st=nyt (discussing Obama administration’s proposal to make buying 
homes more difficult for some Americans).  
 83 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 235 (1972).  
 84 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 746-47 (Wolters Kluwer, 
5th ed. 2007). 
 85 For example, cantaloupe grown on a Colorado farm caused a multi-state 
outbreak of listeria poisoning in 2011. Authorities had difficulty, however, determining 
to which states exactly the tainted cantaloupe were shipped, thus complicating the 
attempt to stem the outbreak. See, e.g., Michael Booth, More States May Have Received 
Listeria-Contaminated Cantaloupe, DENVER POST (Sept. 22, 2011, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_18955276. 
 86 21 U.S.C. § 2223 (2006).  
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regulation, because if an individual thinks chicken inspection is 
inadequate, that individual can choose not to buy chicken.87  
Third, because of the difficulty of knowing where one’s 
food comes from, and the invisibility of the processes that led to 
its packaging in its current consumable form, citizens have less 
personal control over determining the source of any foodborne 
illness. One cannot see the pathogens that spread foodborne 
illness, nor is the consumer exposed to the production facility 
where the pathogen originated. By contrast, even if the 
pollutant itself targeted by environmental litigants is invisible, 
it is most likely that its origin is not.88 This inability to self-
trace in the food-safety context leads to the necessity for a 
reliance on experts and scientific evidence at an early stage of 
litigation, and is compounded in the case of impact litigation. 
B. The Disparate Historical Development of Food Safety 
and Environmental Protection 
Major milestones in American environmentalism, 
including developments in the governmental management of 
natural resources, as well as the ferment of citizen activity, 
coincide roughly with major milestones in the developments of 
a national food-safety regulatory regime. These milestones 
generally took place at times of urbanization and technological 
advancement, which led to actual threats on the country’s 
natural resources and food supply, as well as to national 
anxiety regarding threats to traditional ways of life, and 
consequentially, to human health.  
However, the regulatory and legislative structures 
developed very differently in the two fields. In the context of 
environmental protection, the government organized entities to 
manage natural resources but major environmental legislation 
was not passed until the early 1970s, whereas in the context of 
food-safety regulation, we see the amendment and 
supplementation of several major statutes that originated at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. We also see that, in 
environmental protection, citizen advocacy groups were always 
an important counterpart to governmental regulation, a 
situation that did not exist in the context of food safety. 
  
 87 Of course, consumer choice is constrained by numerous factors, including 
cultural norms, economic realities, and governmental policy.  
 88 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 182-83 (2000). 
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1. A Brief History of Environmental Protection in the 
United States 
The first wave of American environmentalism took place 
at the turn of the twentieth century in reaction to a massive 
increase in immigration and urbanization.89 From 1860 to 1890 
the United States population increased from thirty-one million 
to seventy-five million people, and between 1860 and 1900 the 
number of people living in urban areas doubled from 20 percent 
to 40 percent.90 In 1890, the United States Census Bureau 
declared the United States frontier officially closed, and in 1893, 
Frederick Jackson Turner articulated his famous thesis as to the 
effect of the frontier, and its closing, on American history.91 
Urbanization resulted in the need for the American people to 
refashion their relationship with the natural resources of the 
country.  
A small group of prominent intellectuals and public 
figures brought the perceived necessity for the conservation of 
the American wilderness to the nation’s attention.92 The Sierra 
Club was founded in 1892, and the National Audubon Society 
in 1905. Theodore Roosevelt’s administration embarked on a 
concerted campaign to forward the regulated use of resources 
towards the goal of the fullest use for the present generation.93 
Before Roosevelt left office in 1909, he worked with the head of 
the Forest Service and the secretary of the interior to withdraw 
over four million acres of the public domain from consideration 
for private sale.94 
In the 1930s, a series of natural disasters began to make 
apparent the consequences that could ensue from the 
unregulated exploitation of the nation’s resources. For 
  
 89 See MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 8 (MIT Press 1995). 
 90 ROBERT L. DORMAN, A WORD FOR NATURE: FOUR PIONEERING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ADVOCATES, 1845-1913, at 130 (University of North Carolina Press 1998).  
 91 See TURNER, supra note 81. 
 92 See STEPHEN FOX, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: JOHN MUIR 
AND HIS LEGACY 110 (University of Wisconsin Press 1981). Historians of the American 
environmental protection movement divide the early twentieth century environmental 
movement into two strains, the conservationist—which measured nature’s value 
according to its worth for mankind—and the preservationist—which was ecologic and 
biocentric. See id. at 108; JOSEPH M. PETULLA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: 
VALUES, TACTICS, PRIORITIES 26 (Texas A & M Press 1980). 
 93 M. NELSON MCGEARY, GIFFORD PINCHOT: FORESTER-POLITICIAN 98 
(Princeton University Press 1960); MICHAEL L. SMITH, PACIFIC VISIONS: CALIFORNIA 
SCIENTISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1850-1915, at 174-82 (Yale University Press 1987). 
 94 MCGEARY, supra note 93, at 116-17.  
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example, the dust storms of the 1930s, which rendered nine 
million acres of formerly arable land unusable by 1938, were 
partly the result of haphazard farming practices.95 After World 
War II, several organizations concerned with conserving the 
country’s natural resources became involved in major, and 
public, environmental battles,96 and these organizations, 
including the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, had over 
three hundred thousand members by 1960.97  
It was not until the publication of Rachel Carson’s 
monumentally influential book Silent Spring in 1962, however, 
that the American populace was galvanized to the cause of 
environmental protection. Silent Spring addressed the effects of 
DDT and other pesticides on human health and the environment.98 
The book was on the New York Times bestseller list for thirty-one 
weeks and sold over a half million hardcover copies.99  
The 1960s also saw the advent of strategic 
environmental litigation brought by public interest groups as 
administrative law challenges. Beginning with the 1965 case 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Commission, in which the Second Circuit allowed citizens 
standing to sue under the Federal Power Act to overturn three 
orders of the Federal Power Commission based on their 
“interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational 
aspects of power development,”100 newly formed environmental 
groups aggressively sought judicial review of administrative 
action.101 The organizations bringing these challenges faced 
hurdles, especially regarding their standing to sue (although 
Scenic Hudson was a milestone in that regard), but pursued 
suits nonetheless.102  
Inspired by this movement, a flood of environmental 
legislation was passed in the early 1970s.103 Congress intended 
  
 95 DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 
221-53 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 1994).  
 96 KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE GREEN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, 1962-1992, at 5 (Hill & Wang 1993). 
 97 Id. at 5-6. 
 98 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1994) (1962). 
 99 SALE, supra note 96, at 4.  
 100 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 101 David Sive, The Litigation Process in the Development of Environmental 
Law (1995 Garrison Lecture), 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 727, 731 & n.20 (2002) (listing 
pre-NEPA environmental cases). 
 102 A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
STORIES 81 (Foundation Press 2005).  
 103 This legislation includes the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006); the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006); 
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citizens and advocacy groups to have a role in enforcing the new 
environmental legislation,104 and these statutes contain citizen-
suit provisions, a legal mechanism encouraging citizen actions 
against polluters. These powerful provisions permit “any person” 
to sue certain persons, including government officials, who violate 
certain legal obligations, or who fail to carry out nondiscretionary 
duties.105 The remedies available in such suits are injunctive relief, 
civil penalties—which go to the federal treasury, and the recovery 
of attorney’s fees and costs.106 The citizen-suit provisions were 
written into environmental laws partly to encourage the very 
litigation that was already taking place.107 
2. A Brief History of Food-Safety Regulation in the 
United States 
The urbanization of the country that took place at the 
turn of the twentieth century also resulted in massive changes 
to the relationship between individuals and the food supply. 
Consolidation of the food supply and the creation of 
distribution networks became necessary to feed large 
populations of people who could not grow their own food. The 
end of the nineteenth century also saw extensive development 
in food science, especially in the creation of new food 
additives.108 At that time, only certain imported foods were 
subject to federal regulation—all other food regulation was 
state and local.109  
Public awareness of the need for national regulation was 
raised during the late nineteenth century by the head of the U.S. 
Bureau of Chemistry, Harvey W. Wiley, M.D., who campaigned 
  
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006); the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006); and 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).  
 104 Indeed, environmental organizations assisted in the drafting of certain of 
the new statutes. See ADAMS ET AL., supra note 77, at 51, 53 (explaining how two 
members of the Natural Resources Defense Council helped to draft the 1977 
amendments to the Clean Air Act); Tarlock, supra note 102, at 92 n.51 (recounting the 
influence of Myron Cherry, an important anti-nuclear lawyer in the 1970s, on the 
drafting of NEPA and its legislative history).  
 105 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). 
 106 It is important to keep in mind, however, that the existence of a citizen-
suit provision does not satisfy Article III standing requirements; a litigant must still 
show injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability before her suit may proceed. Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562, 571-78 (1992).  
 107 ADAMS ET AL., supra note 77, at 27. 
 108 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 5. 
 109 Hutt, supra note 21, at 6. 
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for a federal food and drug law. The press also began to expose 
some safety problems with commonly used food preservatives 
and dyes.110 A series of damaging newspaper articles about the 
food industry as well as the publication in 1905 of Upton 
Sinclair’s The Jungle garnered public support for the national 
regulation of the food supply, and in 1906, Congress passed the 
Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act.111 The 
Food and Drug Act was to be administered by the Bureau of 
Chemistry within the USDA, and the FMIA by the Bureau of 
Animal Industry, also within the USDA.112 
The focus of each of the 1906 acts was to prevent the 
adulteration of food, and the Food and Drugs Act included the 
prohibition of additives that would be deleterious to human 
health as well as of substances that would dilute the product 
for the purpose of making the food cheaper to produce.113 The 
Meat Inspection Act prohibited adulterated or misbranded 
livestock products to be sold as food, and also mandated the 
improvement of sanitation at slaughtering facilities, in 
response to Sinclair’s book.114  
The Bureau of Chemistry was split in 1927, with 
regulatory functions, including responsibility for the 1906 Act, 
taken over by the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration 
(which became the FDA in 1930).115 Responsibility for the Meat 
Inspection Act was not transferred, however, and authority for 
its enforcement remained within the Department of 
Agriculture. FDA officials began advocating for the 
modernization of the 1906 Act in 1933,116 but passage of a new 
bill was stalled until 1938.117 Precipitating passage of the 1938 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) was the death 
of over one hundred people in 1937 who had taken an antibiotic 
that had been mixed with a sweet substance to improve its 
  
 110 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 5-6. Wiley established a “Poison Squad”—a group 
of volunteers who consumed food additives, including boric acid and formaldehyde, to 
assess their effects on the human body. Id. at 5; see also About FDA: Milestones in U.S. 
Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/default.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).  
 111 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6. 
 112 Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety 
Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 78-79 (2000). 
 113 Hutt, supra note 21, at 6. 
 114 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6. 
 115 About FDA: Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ 
ucm128305.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
 116 Hutt, supra note 21, at 7.  
 117 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 13. 
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taste, but had never been tested for safety.118 In 1940, the FDA 
was transferred from the USDA to the Federal Security 
Agency, and in 1988, to the Department of Health and Human 
Services, with a commissioner of food and drugs appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.119  
Since 1938, the FFDCA has been amended hundreds of 
times.120 Significantly, during World War II, food processing 
technology was developed to preserve and transport food for 
war, and this massive alteration in the general food supply led 
to public concern about the addition of synthetic ingredients 
and potential carcinogens to the food supply.121 The FDA 
reacted by passing the 1958 Food Additives Amendment and 
the 1960 Color Additive Amendment. The 1970s and 1980s saw 
such food-safety amendments to the FFDCA as the Low-Acid 
Food Processing Regulations (1973).122 The Nutritional Labeling 
and Education Act was passed in 1990.123 
As to meat and poultry, the Poultry Products Inspection 
Act (PPIA) was passed by Congress in 1957 in response to a 
rapidly expanding poultry industry, which was also developing 
poultry processing techniques. In 1967, the FMIA was amended 
as the Wholesome Meat Act, which requires the inspection of all 
meat, and the PPIA was amended in 1968. In 1971, the Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service, a division of the USDA, 
was charged with meat and poultry inspection, and this was 
assigned to the Food Safety and Quality Service in 1977. The 
Food Safety and Quality Service became the Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS) in 1981.124 
Food-safety advocates have never embraced impact 
litigation as a way to achieve food-safety goals. Even food-
safety organizations claiming to use litigation as a strategy to 
achieve their goals use it sparingly. For example, the Center 
for Food Safety, which was established in 1997, and is a “non-
profit public interest and environmental advocacy membership 
  
 118 Id.; FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6. 
 119 About FDA: Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra 
note 115.  
 120 See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 14-15. 
 121 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 7; HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, 
at 393-94. Concern about carcinogens and pesticides was also, at this time, galvanizing 
the environmental movement.  
 122 Low Acid Regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 108.25, 108.35 (2010). 
 123 FORTIN, supra note 20, at 8. 
 124 About FSIS: Agency History, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & 
INSPECTION SERV., http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_Fsis/Agency_History/index.asp (last 
modified Nov. 7, 2011). 
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organization [that] combines multiple tools and strategies in 
pursuing its goals, including litigation and legal petitions for 
rulemaking,”125 is listed as a party in fewer than forty cases 
since its founding.126 The Center for Science in the Public 
Interest, an influential consumer advocacy organization 
focused on improving public health, nutrition, and food safety, 
is listed as a party in under twenty cases since its founding in 
1971.127 By comparison, since its founding in 1967, the 
Environmental Defense Fund is listed as a party in 
approximately 280, and since 1970, the year of its founding, 
NRDC is listed as a party in over 750 cases. Since 1997, when 
the Center for Food Safety was founded, the NRDC is listed as 
a party in over 400 cases.128  
This comparison of impact litigation in the realms of 
environmental protection and food safety serves to illustrate 
how environmental advocates and food-safety advocates have 
different approaches to advocacy and effective means of 
change.129 It is crucial to emphasize that the difference cannot 
be explained by the lack of citizen-suit provisions in the food-
safety laws. As mentioned above, the passage of environmental 
legislation in the 1970s was not the beginning of 
environmental-impact litigation. Although environmental-
impact litigation accelerated greatly after the passage of 
environmental legislation, strategic litigation had been 
imagined and implemented in the decade prior, as 
environmental advocacy organizations, both old and new, 
began to litigate to protect the environment.130  
  
 125 About Us, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/ 
about (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
 126 Result yielded from a Westlaw search performed on April 14, 2012. See 
WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (search “ti(‘Center for Food Safety’)” in the “allcases” 
database “after 1/1/1997”). 
 127 In 2005, CSPI hired Stephen Gardner to direct its food-safety litigation, 
which is focused on private litigation against companies that refuse to take action to 
improve food safety. This strategy has been remarkably successful in improving the 
food safety of market-leading companies, as well as improving relationships between 
these companies and advocacy organizations, such as CSPI. Telephone Interview with 
Stephen Gardner (Jan. 5, 2011). 
 128 Results yielded from a Westlaw search performed on April 14, 2012. See 
WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (search “ti(‘Environmental Defense Fund’)” in the 
“allcases” database “after 1/1/1967”; “ti(‘Natural Resources Defense Council’)” in the 
“allcases” database “after 1/1/1970”; and “ti(‘Natural Resources Defense Council’)” in 
the “allcases” database “after 1/1/1997”). 
 129 See, e.g., Sive, supra note 101, at 729 (“In no other political and social 
movement has litigation played such an important and dominant role [as in the 
environmental movement].” (citation omitted)). 
 130 ADAMS & ET AL., supra note 77, at 53; Tarlock, supra note 102, at 82 n.15; 
Sive, supra note 101, at 731. 
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Nor can the disparity be explained by pointing to the 
superior funding of the environmental advocacy groups—
although the NRDC was founded in part with money from the 
Ford Foundation, this money was granted after the idea to focus 
on litigation was formed, not before.131 It may be impossible to 
actually identify why food-safety litigation is not a prevalent form 
of advocacy and activism, but it is important to note that the 
absence of the development of such a tradition was not dictated by 
legal constraints, nor prescribed by social circumstances. 
III. JUSTICIABILITY BARRIERS TO FOOD-SAFETY-IMPACT 
LITIGATION 
Food-safety-impact litigation faces difficulties getting 
into court because it involves multiple—including 
associational—parties, probabilistic harms, widely-shared 
harms, and requests for prospective relief. The judicial system 
is still struggling to adapt traditional doctrines of justiciability 
to such litigation, even though such litigation has been ongoing 
in various contexts since at least the middle of last century.132 
Although it is relatively uncontroversial that suits based on 
uncertain injury can be heard by federal courts,133 the questions 
of who can bring such suits, when they are ready for suit, and 
where the suits can be brought are still vigorously contested, 
with the answers changing by jurisdiction, and over time. 
These questions of who, when, and where must be determined 
before courts can reach the merits.  
The justiciability barriers most likely to be faced by 
food-safety impact litigants are standing challenges and 
challenges to justiciability under the APA.134  
A. Standing 
Standing determines whether a federal court litigant is 
the proper party to bring the suit before the court.135 The notion 
  
 131 ADAMS & ET AL., supra note 77, at 17-24. 
 132 All social justice litigation falls into this model, including litigation in the 
fields of civil rights and environmental protection. 
 133 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Brandt v. Vill. of Winnetka, 
612 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 134 Although ripeness and mootness challenges in this context are conceivable, 
indeed likely, I focus here on the actual cases and the barriers with which courts have 
actually grappled when dealing with this type of litigation. 
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of standing has both constitutional and prudential dimensions. 
A court must first determine if the litigant meets the criteria of 
Article III: (1) whether the litigant has suffered an injury-in-
fact, which must be “concrete and particularized,” and “actual 
or imminent”; (2) whether the alleged injury is fairly traceable 
to the harm targeted; and (3) whether the remedy sought is 
likely to redress the alleged injury.136 Prudential concerns 
include prohibitions against the litigation of generalized 
grievances and litigating the rights of third parties, and 
determining whether the litigant is within the zone of interests 
of the statute at issue.137 
In 1992, the Supreme Court made it more difficult for 
impact plaintiffs to establish standing, even when they are 
suing pursuant to a citizen-suit provision. In Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, the Court denied standing to several 
environmental organizations challenging a regulation as 
violating the Endangered Species Act.138 The Court found that 
the organizations did not adequately allege injury in fact.139 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, wrote, “when the 
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or 
inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is 
ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”140  
Most significantly, the decision prohibited Congress 
from statutorily creating a legal injury and thereby bestowing 
standing upon citizens.141 The Court held that a citizen-suit 
provision did not eliminate the need for a plaintiff to show that 
she has sustained direct and personal injury.142 In Lujan, the 
  
 135 For a comprehensive discussion and critique of the separation of powers 
rationale for the standing doctrine, see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).  
 136 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Whether 
these three criteria actually stem directly from Article III, or are themselves judge-
made and perhaps misguided, is a matter of discussion among commentators. See, e.g., 
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988); Sunstein, 
supra note 63, at 185-86. Nevertheless, used as they have been as Article III criteria for 
the last four decades, they are, at this point, accepted as constitutional. 
 137 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 138 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
 139 A plurality of the Court also found that the plaintiffs had not established 
redressability. Id. at 568-71. 
 140 Id. at 562 (citation omitted). 
 141 The Court explained that Congress could still create legally cognizable 
injuries, i.e., it could “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de 
facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id. at 578. What Congress could 
not do was “abandon . . . the requirement that the party seeking review must himself 
have suffered an injury.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 142 Id. at 573. 
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Court of Appeals had held that the organizational petitioners 
had adequately alleged injury in fact because they alleged a 
procedural injury—that the Secretary of the Interior had failed 
to consult as required by the ESA—and that this procedural 
injury was adequate because of the citizen-suit provision, even 
if the petitioners failed to allege a personal injury.143 The Lujan 
Court rejected this view, explaining that  
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest 
in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual 
right” vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from 
the president to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important 
constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”144  
The Court held that a litigant must show that she herself had 
suffered “injury in fact,” and had a tangible and concrete stake, 
beyond the vindication of a right as a citizen, in the outcome of 
the case.145  
By requiring a showing of personalized injury-in-fact 
even when alleging procedural injury, the Court in Lujan made 
it significantly more difficult for the beneficiaries of regulation 
to protect their interests. Commentators predicted that citizen-
suit environmental litigation would be severely restricted, or 
even eliminated, and the environmental advocacy community 
began to plan different tactical routes toward the enforcement 
and strengthening of environmental litigation.146 The Court 
reinforced its strict interpretation of Article III standing in 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, which held that 
plaintiffs did not have Article III standing based on a lack of 
redressability when the violations for which the plaintiffs sued 
had occurred solely in the past.147  
The standing cases of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
demonstrate a general tightening of standing law and a trend 
toward the restriction of access to courts for regulatory 
beneficiaries in public law litigation. This trend did not, 
however, reflect a unified court, nor consensus among the 
justices, and in the late 1990s the Court began to relax its 
approach to standing. 
  
 143 Id. at 571, 572. 
 144 Id. at 577. 
 145 Id. at 575-78. 
 146 Buzbee, supra note 76, at 214-20. 
 147 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998). 
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In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, the Court, with a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, 
the author of the Lujan and Steel Co. decisions, backed away 
from the broadest implications of the Lujan decision, and 
granted standing to several environmental organizations that 
had instituted a citizen suit against a company for alleged 
Clean Water Act violations.148 The Court held that the 
availability of civil penalties against the company was 
adequate to provide redressability for the citizen plaintiffs 
because of the potential that such penalties would deter future 
violations, although injunctive relief against the company was 
not available because the company had ceased violations since 
the commencement of the litigation.149 Distinguishing Steel Co., 
the Court explained that in Laidlaw the violations had not 
ceased prior to suit as in Steel Co., but had been ongoing at the 
time suit was commenced.150 Moreover, the Court found that the 
absence of evidence of injury to the environment was irrelevant 
to the injury-in-fact analysis because the plaintiffs were 
harmed by the lessening of the aesthetic and recreational 
values of the area.151  
After the Court’s movement away from its extremely 
restrictive standing decisions of the early 1990s, it appears that 
citizen suits were once again viable. Laidlaw and other 
contemporaneous cases152 signaled the Court’s return to deference 
to legislatively defined injuries, and thereby wedged the doors to 
the courtroom back open for legislative beneficiaries.153  
The Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA further 
affirmed this trend. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court found 
that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s 
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor 
  
 148 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 149 Id. at 173-74. 
 150 Id. at 187-88. 
 151 Id. at 181. 
 152 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
 153 In Akins, a group of voters had challenged a Federal Election Commission’s 
determination that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a 
“political committee” as defined by statute, and, consequentially, that AIPAC did not 
have to disclose certain information. See id. at 13-14. The Court held that the 
petitioners had standing to challenge the FEC’s determination because Congress had 
specifically granted such parties the right to sue; the statute in question contained a 
provision that “any person who believes a violation of this Act . . . has occurred, may 
file a Complaint with the Commission.” Id. at 19 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (1971)). 
The Court wrote that “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ that respondents have suffered consists of 
their inability to obtain information . . . that, on respondents’ view of the law, the 
statute requires that AIPAC make public.” Id. at 21. 
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vehicles under the Clean Air Act.154 The Court provided 
Massachusetts with “special solicitude in [the] standing 
analysis” based on its sovereign status,155 but also found, with a 
potentially wide reach, that climate-change risks pose a 
concrete and particularized injury to Massachusetts as a 
landowner, even though the harm may be widely shared, and 
that the alleged injury (global warming) would be lessened by 
the requested remedy (a reduction in motor vehicles emissions), 
if not eliminated.156 The full reach of the Court’s standing and 
redressability analyses remains to be seen.157 
The zone-of-interests test is also significant in any 
discussion of food-safety-impact litigation. This test is a 
prudential standing requirement fashioned by the Supreme 
Court providing that the interest alleged by the plaintiff must 
arguably be within the zone of interests protected by the statute 
or constitutional provision at issue.158 To satisfy this test, 
congressional intent to benefit the plaintiff is not required.159 In 
1997, the Supreme Court found that the citizen-suit provision of 
the Endangered Species Act negated the zone-of-interests test in 
relation to that statute.160 In the same case, the Court also noted 
the “generous review provisions” of the APA, and clarified that 
the zone-of-interests test should be assessed, not in relation to 
the overall purpose of the statute at issue, but rather in relation 
to the specific provision relied upon.161 
B. Standing in Food-Safety-Impact Litigation 
Standing is a critical issue in food-safety-impact cases. 
Three of the six post-1992 decisions in food-safety impact cases 
  
 154 Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 155 For a discussion of the potential implications of the Court’s reliance on 
Massachusetts’ sovereign status in its standing analysis, see Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State 
Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273 (2007). 
 156 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-23, 525. 
 157 Maxwell L. Stearns argues that the Roberts Court will continue to expand 
standing doctrine in Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical 
Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875 (2008). 
 158 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 159 Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 
492 (1998).  
 160 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997). It is unclear whether this 
holding applies to all statutes with citizen-suit provisions or is confined to the ESA. 
See, e.g., Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t 
of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 n.17 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 161 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163 (citation omitted).  
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that I found involved standing issues.162 Each of these cases was 
a challenge to agency action or inaction brought for the 
ostensible purpose of minimizing the risk of foodborne illness 
in the United States. One survived a motion to dismiss by 
demonstrating injury in fact, the second survived an injury in 
fact challenge only to be dismissed for a lack of redressability, 
and the third had one of its claims dismissed because the 
plaintiffs failed to show that they were within the zone of 
interests protected by the statute.  
1. Using Increased Risk of Harm as a Means to Show 
Injury-in-Fact in Food-Safety-Impact Cases 
Plaintiffs in food-safety-impact suits must find a way to 
show that they have suffered concrete and particularized injury 
from the challenged regulation although they have not 
contracted a foodborne illness.163 Although they may represent 
themselves as a consumer of the regulated food, they must 
show that their grievance is more than a generalized one.164 
Several courts have held that an allegation of increased risk of 
injury due to a challenged agency action suffices to show such a 
concrete and particularized injury, but this trend has mainly, 
although not always, been confined to the environmental 
context. In Baur v. Veneman, however, a 2003 case regarding 
mad cow disease, the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court’s dismissal of the case for lack of Article III standing, 
finding that increased risk of harm—based on the increased 
  
 162 See supra note 64. I confined my discussion to post-1992 cases because 
cases involving a standing analysis but decided pre-1992 are less useful in determining 
whether food-safety-impact litigation is currently viable. For example, in Public Citizen v. 
Foreman, a 1980 case, a public interest organization and several of its members sought a 
declaratory judgment from both the FDA and the USDA that nitrites were an unsafe food 
additive, especially in bacon, but faced a standing challenge. The D.C. Circuit found 
plaintiffs’ allegation that nitrite-free bacon was not available at a reasonable price to be 
an adequate injury-in-fact. 631 F.2d 969, 974 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Post Lujan, the court 
may have more strictly analyzed plaintiffs’ standing. Whether such an injury would be 
sufficiently concrete or particularized is unclear. Moreover, whether such an injury is the 
type protected by the relevant statutes is also ambiguous, and the plaintiffs may have 
failed the prudential zone-of-interests standing test. 
 163 Particularized means that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992). 
 164 This is not to say that the asserted injury may not be widely shared. A 
widely shared harm may still be a particularized one. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the 
Court has found ‘injury in fact.’”). 
2012] NOT SICK YET 935 
risk of contracting a foodborne disease—satisfied the injury in 
fact requirement in the context of food and drug safety suits.165  
The plaintiff in this case, Michael Baur, challenged the 
USDA’s and the FDA’s allowance of “downed” cattle into the 
food supply.166 “Downed” cattle are cattle that are too sick to 
stand or walk before slaughter, and, at the time, USDA 
regulations allowed downed cattle to enter the food supply after 
inspection. Baur alleged that downed cattle were more likely to 
carry transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), 
which are progressive neurological diseases.167 The most 
common of these is bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
which is known as “mad cow disease.”168 Baur claimed that the 
downed cattle policy violated both the FMIA and the FFDCA. 
After Baur’s petition to the USDA and the FDA was 
denied, he brought suit in district court under the APA seeking 
judicial review of the FSIS’s decision.169 Baur claimed standing 
  
 165 Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 166 In 1998, Michael Baur and Farm Sanctuary, Inc., an animal protection 
organization, filed a petition with the USDA and the FDA requesting that the agencies 
“label all downed cattle as adulterated,” under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FFDCA), Section 342(a)(5). Baur, 352 F.3d at 628. This section of the FFDCA 
provides that any food that is “the product of a diseased animal” is adulterated. 21 
U.S.C. § 342 (a)(5) (2006). The FFDCA prohibits the manufacture, delivery, receipt, or 
introduction of adulterated food “into interstate commerce.” Id. § 331. 
 167 Baur, 352 F.3d at 627-28. 
 168 Id. at 627. 
 169 Michael Baur originally brought suit with Farm Sanctuary, Inc., an animal 
welfare organization. Farm Sanctuary claimed that its members were injured when they 
observed the treatment of animals at slaughterhouses. The district court dismissed Farm 
Sanctuary’s claims because it had failed to state an interest within the zone of interests of 
the FMIA. Farm Sanctuary did not appeal its dismissal on standing grounds, and the 
Second Circuit opinion only discusses Baur. For that reason, I refer only to Baur, 
although he was joined by Farm Sanctuary at early stages of the litigation. See Farm 
Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman, 221 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
  Note that there is no requirement in the Article III injury-in-fact standing 
inquiry that the plaintiff’s alleged reason for bringing suit is genuine. The court does 
not address whether Baur’s alleged injury—increased risk of foodborne illness—is 
genuine, or, in other words, if that is Baur’s real motive for being before the court, 
which in this case, was open to question. Farm Sanctuary is a prominent animal 
protection organization, founded in 1986 by Gene Baur “to combat the abuses of factory 
farming and to encourage a new awareness and understanding about ‘farm animals.’” 
About Us, FARM SANCTUARY, http://farmsanctuary.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 13, 
2012). The organization opposed what it saw as the unusually cruel practice of 
dragging a cow that has collapsed on the way to the slaughterhouse to be killed. Robert 
Terenzi, Jr., When Cows Fly: Expanding Cognizable Injury-in-Fact and Interest Group 
Litigation, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1561 (2009). Many of the members of Farm 
Sanctuary, however, were vegan. For this reason, Michael Baur, Gene Baur’s brother 
and a Fordham Law professor, joined the case to provide a meat-eating plaintiff. Id. A 
court may delve deeper into a plaintiff’s asserted reason for bringing suit if there is a 
disjunction between an association’s stated reason and the main purposes for the 
association’s existence. If the association’s purpose for existence does not fall into the 
zone of interests protected by the statute at issue, the association’s suit may be 
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based on his status as a consumer of meat who was at 
increased risk of contracting a foodborne illness because of the 
USDA’s policies regarding downed cattle.170 The district court 
dismissed Baur’s claims for lack of Article III standing, finding 
that because there was, as yet, no evidence of BSE in the 
United States, the harm that he alleged was too speculative 
and not sufficiently particularized to support standing.171  
The Second Circuit reversed. First, the court held that 
Baur’s increased risk of harm claim was capable of satisfying 
the injury in fact requirement.172 Baur sued under the FMIA 
and the FFDCA, and the court recognized that the purpose of 
these statutes is, in part, to protect the nation’s food supply 
and minimize the risk from dangerous food.173 There was a 
“tight connection” between the injury alleged and the allegedly 
violated statutes.174 The court explained that  
[a]lthough this type of injury has been most commonly recognized in 
environmental cases, the reasons for treating enhanced risk as 
sufficient injury-in-fact in the environmental context extend by 
analogy to consumer food and drug safety suits. Like threatened 
environmental harm, the potential harm from exposure to dangerous 
food products or drugs “is by nature probabilistic,” yet an 
unreasonable exposure to risk may itself cause cognizable injury.175 
The court also found that Baur had shown that he 
himself faced a credible harm because “the probability of harm 
which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to allege a 
cognizable injury-in-fact logically varies with the severity of the 
probable harm.”176 Thus because of the severity of contracting 
  
dismissed for lack of standing. See Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United 
Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 170 Baur, 352 F.3d at 630. 
 171 Id. at 631. 
 172 Id. at 636. 
 173 Id. at 634-35. 
 174 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 
(1988). Fletcher advocates a return to the “legal interest” test for standing, which asks 
only whether the plaintiff has a legal right bestowed by the legal provision under which 
he is suing, and if so, does not require an injury in fact. He writes that the APA was 
meant to provide a flexible standing rule, and that if a litigant bases suit on a statute, 
the court should look to the relevant statute to determine whether the litigant should 
have standing, not whether the litigant has suffered an “injury in fact.” Id. at 255-65. 
Although not throwing over the injury in fact requirement, the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Baur incorporates Fletcher’s viewpoint by looking at the degree of 
connection between the injury alleged and the statutes implicated. 
 175 Baur, 352 F.3d at 634 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper 
Recycling, Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 176 Id. at 637. The court explained that although the standard was lenient at 
the pleading stage, the plaintiff could still not rely on conclusory allegations to show 
standing. Id. This analysis may have been different had the case been decided after the 
 
2012] NOT SICK YET 937 
mad cow disease, which is fatal and has no known cure, the 
court held that the increase in risk may be moderate for 
standing purposes. The court found the fact that Baur’s 
allegations were supported by government studies supported 
his claim for standing, as did the fact that his alleged increased 
risk of harm resulted from an “established governmental 
policy.”177 Incidentally, after the Second Circuit decision in Baur 
was filed, on December 23, 2003, a cow in Washington State 
was diagnosed with BSE.178 Soon thereafter, the USDA passed a 
regulation banning downed cattle from the food supply,179 and 
the case became moot. 
While increased risk of harm is a widely recognized 
basis for injury in fact, it is not entirely uncontroversial.180 The 
Baur Court commented that “the courts of appeals have 
generally recognized that threatened harm in the form of an 
increased risk of future injury may serve as injury-in-fact for 
Article III standing purposes,” and that “[w]ithout questioning 
standing, the Supreme Court has decided cases in which it 
appeared to assume that enhanced risk may cause real 
injury.”181 However, as mentioned above, increased risk of harm 
has rarely been used outside of environmental law cases. 
Indeed, the Second Circuit refused to sanction the doctrine 
generally, but instead held only that “[i]n the specific context of 
  
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which instructed district courts 
that a plaintiff needed factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level,” and must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Lower courts are now grappling with the implications 
of applying the “plausibility standard,” to determinations regarding challenges to 
subject matter jurisdiction, including standing challenges. See, e.g., Coal. for a 
Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (E.D. Cal. 
2010); Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, No. CV 09-357-SMM, 2010 WL 2926237 (W.D. 
Wash. July 23, 2010). 
 177 Baur, 352 F.3d at 637. The dissent in Baur argued that Baur had not 
shown that he himself faced a credible harm of contracting BSE. The dissenting Judge 
found the absence of evidence of BSE in the United States to be particularly 
significant, and wrote that although Baur may be correct in his allegations that the 
USDA should act differently to prevent an outbreak of BSE in the country, he “cannot 
properly use this Court as vehicle to advance the claims to proper policy.” Id. at 652.  
 178 Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t 
of Agric., No. 05-35264, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17360, at *18 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2005).  
 179 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b) (2010). For a discussion of the USDA’s regulatory 
response to mad cow disease, and an argument that the agency has acted 
incompetently and inefficiently, see Jason R. Odeshoo, No Brainer? The USDA’s 
Regulatory Response to the Discovery of Mad Cow Disease in the United States, 16 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 277 (2005). 
 180 For a discussion of whether risk itself is a harm, see Claire Finkelstein, Is 
Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (2003). 
 181 See Baur, 352 F.3d at 633 & n.7 (listing cases). 
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food and drug safety suits . . . we conclude that such injuries 
are cognizable for standing purposes, where the plaintiff 
alleges exposure to potentially harmful products.”182  
The Second Circuit cited cases from the Fourth Circuit, 
the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit to 
show the general acceptance of increased risk of harm as a 
basis for Article III standing. All of the cited cases, except those 
in the Seventh Circuit, were in the environmental context.183 
And although it has recognized that increased risk can be a 
basis for standing, the D.C. Circuit has taken a strict view of 
whether increased risk of harm constitutes injury in fact. In 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, the court vacated its earlier decision which had 
dismissed NRDC’s petition for lack of standing.184 In this case, 
NRDC sued the EPA, charging that the agency’s issuance of a 
rule establishing exemptions from an international treaty that 
mandated the reduction of the use of methyl bromide—a 
substance that degrades the ozone layer—violated both the 
treaty and the Clean Air Act.185 The court initially held that 
NRDC’s claim that its members faced a greater chance of 
contracting skin cancer and other illnesses under the EPA rule 
was too hypothetical to constitute injury-in-fact.186 NRDC 
moved for rehearing, and both NRDC and EPA, in its 
opposition to the petition for rehearing, presented new 
  
 182 Id. at 634. 
 183 Id. at 633. Courts have occasionally recognized increased risk of harm as a 
basis for Article III standing in contexts outside of environmental law. For example, in 
Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit 
permitted a plaintiff’s allegation of an increased risk of harm from the implantation of 
a medical device that required current medical monitoring to constitute injury in fact. 
The court accepted plaintiff’s analogy to cases where plaintiffs have been exposed to 
toxins (i.e., nuclear emissions or asbestos) and have an increased risk of disease. Id. at 
571. Courts in the Second Circuit have also permitted an allegation of increased risk of 
harm to satisfy the injury in fact requirement when a plaintiff claims an “increased 
future risk of identity theft,” see Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 
F. Supp. 2d 273, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), an increased risk of being assessed penalties 
because of reliance on fraudulent tax advice, see Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 
F.3d 253, 264-65 (2d Cir. 2006) (“An injury-in-fact may simply be the fear or anxiety of 
future harm. For example, exposure to toxic or harmful substances has been held 
sufficient to satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact requirement even without physical 
symptoms of injury caused by the exposure, and even though exposure alone may not 
provide sufficient grounds for a claim under state tort law.”), and an increased risk of 
injury based on the defendant’s failure to secure plaintiff prisoner’s wheelchair 
properly when he was being transported. Shariff v. Goord, 04-CV-6621 CJS(F), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49957, at *10, *20 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2006). 
 184 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacating 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 185 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 186 Id. at 484. 
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information regarding the risk to NRDC’s members from the 
EPA’s rule.187 In response to this new information, the D.C. 
Circuit found that NRDC did have standing.188 Based on the 
EPA’s own expert estimate, the court calculated that two to 
four of NRDC’s five hundred thousand members would develop 
cancer as a result of the rule—a risk the court considered 
sufficient to support standing.189 
In NRDC, the court expressly did not decide whether it 
was appropriate to take a quantitative approach to 
determining whether an increased risk of injury constituted 
injury in fact.190 The court repeated its refusal to decide whether 
any increase in risk was enough for standing shortly thereafter 
in Virginia State Corp. Commission v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, but cabined this open question to 
environmental disputes, stating that “[o]utside the realm of 
environmental disputes . . . we have suggested that a claim of 
increased risk or probability cannot suffice.”191 
The D.C. Circuit clarified its position on increased risk 
in the non-environmental context a year later, in 2007, in 
Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.192 In Public Citizen, petitioners—including a 
citizens group, tire makers, and a tire industry association—
challenged a federal motor vehicle safety standard requiring 
cars to contain tire pressure monitors that lit up when the tire 
pressure fell below a set standard.193 The court asked for 
supplemental briefing on whether the challenged standard 
“creates a substantial increase in the risk of death, physical 
injury, or property loss,” over the alternative interpretation, 
and whether the risk of harm, including the alleged increase, 
was substantial.194 The court noted that it had only allowed 
standing in increased risk of harm cases when both of these 
factors were present, noting that there were several reasons 
  
 187 Natural Res. Def. Council, 464 F.3d at 3. 
 188 Id. at 7. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 6-7. After deciding NRDC had standing, the court dismissed the case 
on the merits. Id. at 11. 
 191 Va. State Corp. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 468 F.3d 845, 
848 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In this case the court found that it “need not face those issues 
here,” because petitioner, who had argued that its investors faced an increased risk of 
incorrectly evaluating the company’s financial health, made no showing adequate to 
explain their position. Id. 
 192 Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 193 Id. at 1284. 
 194 Id. at 1297. 
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why standing should not be allowed lightly in probabilistic 
cases: (1) allowing injury based on speculative injury would 
allow judicial review of any agency action because almost all 
agency action slightly increases risk or, according to citizen 
preference, insufficiently decreases risk; (2) speculative injury 
standing would eliminate the requirement that an injury be 
“actual or imminent” from the standing requirements; and (3) 
such cases would cause the judiciary to infringe on the 
Executive’s responsibility to “take care” that the laws were 
faithfully executed by expanding its role beyond the hearing of 
actual cases or controversies.195 Not surprisingly, the court 
found that Public Citizen did not meet its burden in its 
supplemental briefing and dismissed its claims.196 
The United States Supreme Court appeared to accept 
probabilistic harm, characterized as increased risk of injury, as 
support for standing in the environmental context in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.197 Although the Court noted that “rising 
seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal 
land,” it emphasized that  
[t]he severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the 
next century: If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one 
Massachusetts official believes that a significant fraction of coastal 
property will be “either permanently lost through inundation or 
temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.” 
Remediation costs alone, petitioners allege, could run well into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars.198  
  
 195 Id. at 1295. 
 196 Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 
235-36 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of 
Imposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391 (2009) (arguing that the D.C. 
Circuit’s imposition of a substantiality-of-risk threshold is unsupported by any 
theoretical foundation, and is the wrong approach to determining which increased-risk 
cases should be justiciable). 
 197 See Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”: 
Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 194-96 (2007) (discussing the majority’s acceptance of 
probabilistic harm as a basis for standing); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the 
Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494 (2008) (arguing for “precautionary-
based standing,” in which the precautionary principle is applied to the standing 
analysis and in cases where there is uncertainty about whether irreversible and 
catastrophic events will occur). But c.f. Leiter, supra note 196, at 402 (arguing that 
Massachusetts v. EPA does not sanction the use of probabilistic harm as a basis for 
standing, especially not for individual (versus sovereign) plaintiffs). 
 198 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (citation omitted). 
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The Court’s characterization of Massachusetts’ standing relies 
heavily, if not exclusively, on these allegations of future injury.199 
Increased risk of harm as a basis for standing is a 
critical tool for food-safety-impact litigants, and whether their 
claims are successful may depend on whether the courts they 
are before permit increased risk of harm claims in cases 
outside of environmental disputes, and whether the court views 
food-safety issues as either a subset of or analogous to 
environmental disputes. The possibility of reaching the merits 
of the case in such litigation will also depend on whether the 
court applies a quantitative assessment to increased risk, or 
assumes that any increased risk is adequate.200 
2. The Necessity of Third-Party Action May Thwart 
Redressability 
In Levine v. Vilsack, another food-safety-impact case, 
the court found that standing failed on redressability grounds 
rather than injury-in-fact grounds. Here, the district court 
accepted plaintiffs’ allegations of increased injury of harm as a 
basis for Article III standing, but the Court of Appeals found 
that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge a USDA 
Notice because even if the plaintiffs prevailed in court, the 
requested relief was only available through a series of 
speculative steps and the actions of third-parties.201 For this 
reason, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the redressability prong of 
the standing inquiry.  
In 2005, several individual plaintiffs and several 
associational plaintiffs (the “Levine Plaintiffs”) brought suit in 
federal district court, challenging a USDA Notice (“Notice”) 
issued earlier that year, which stated that the slaughter of 
poultry is not governed by any federal standard. The Levine 
Plaintiffs alleged that the Notice was contrary to law, 
specifically to the APA, and to the Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act (HMSA), a 1958 statute that provided that 
“cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock” 
  
 199 In this regard, see Justice Roberts’ dissent: “[A]ccepting a century-long 
time horizon and a series of compounded estimates renders requirements of imminence 
and immediacy utterly toothless. . . . ‘Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy 
the requirements of Art. III. A threatened injury must be certainly impending to 
constitute injury in fact.’” Id. at 542 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 200 Once again, as mentioned supra in note 176, it also remains to be seen how 
courts negotiate the plausibility standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
 201 Levine v. Johanns, 587 F.3d 986, 993-95 (9th Cir. 2009).  
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must be humanely slaughtered.202 In 1978, parts of the HMSA 
were incorporated into the Federal Meat Inspection Act 
(FMIA), which had the effect of prohibiting federal inspection 
of meat that had not been slaughtered in compliance with the 
humane slaughter methods dictated by the HMSA.203 Meat that 
is not federally inspected cannot enter the marketplace. The 
1978 version of the HMSA retained the section of the 1958 
HMSA that listed the types of animals that must be humanely 
slaughtered, which included “other livestock.”204 The Levine 
Plaintiffs argued that because the 1958 HMSA was still in 
force, the Notice—which said that no federal standard applied 
to poultry—was construing “other livestock” to exclude poultry, 
which was an arbitrary and capricious interpretation. Because 
of the Notice, argued the Levine plaintiffs, poultry was being 
slaughtered inhumanely.205 
The associational plaintiffs were nonprofit organizations 
that worked to prevent cruelty to animals, and they brought 
suit challenging the Notice on behalf of their members, who 
were also listed as individual plaintiffs, and who were 
characterized as “regular consumers of poultry meat.” The 
Levine Plaintiffs alleged that inhumane methods of slaughter 
increased the possibility that the poultry would be 
contaminated by bacteria, thereby increasing their risk of 
illness each time they ate inhumanely slaughtered poultry.206  
  
 202 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (2006).  
 203 21 U.S.C. § 610(b) (2006). 
 204 Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006). Confusingly, however, the 1978 
HMSA, while not repealing the section of the 1958 HMSA applying humane slaughter 
standards to “other livestock,” also stated that humane slaughter standards only applied 
to “cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules, and other equines.” 21 U.S.C. § 610(b). 
 205 Levine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *4-5. 
 206 Id. at *5. These plaintiffs were joined by several workers in poultry 
processing plants and two organizations that represented workers. They alleged 
physical and emotional injuries from working in plants where poultry is slaughtered 
inhumanely. Id. at *6-7.  
  After this case was filed, the court related it with another case challenging 
the USDA’s failure to apply humane slaughter requirements to bison and reindeer. 
Plaintiffs in this case alleged that they regularly ate bison and reindeer meat, and were 
therefore at increased risk of contracting food poisoning whenever they ate meat that 
had been inhumanely slaughtered. Id. at *9. The court dismissed the Bison plaintiffs’ 
complaint with prejudice, concluding that the USDA did not have a non-discretionary 
duty to apply the humane slaughter requirements to bison and reindeer, and the APA 
challenge therefore failed. Id. at *46-50. Section 706(1) of the APA provides for a court 
to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(1) (2006), and to bring an action under this section, a plaintiff must show that 
“an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Levine, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *46 (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 
542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). 
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The district court found that the individual plaintiffs 
established the requirements of Article III standing: injury-in-
fact, traceability, and redressability.207 The allegation that 
certain individual plaintiffs were at an increased risk for 
illness was neither too generalized, nor too speculative to 
constitute injury-in-fact.208 As long as a harm “is separate from 
an interest in having the government abide by the law,” it “may 
be concrete even though it is widely shared,” explained the 
court.209 Moreover, the court found there to be a “credible” 
threat that the plaintiffs would suffer concrete harm in the 
future, which it found sufficient to satisfy the imminence prong 
of the injury-in-fact inquiry.210 Analogizing to Baur, the court 
found the plaintiffs’ claims credible because they relied on the 
USDA’s own studies showing that bacterial contamination was 
more likely when inhumane slaughtering methods were used.211 
The court dismissed the claims of the Levine 
associational plaintiffs with leave to amend because they had 
failed to satisfy the requirements for associational standing. 
For an organization to have standing to sue on behalf of its 
members, it must show that: (1) “its members would otherwise 
have standing to sue in their own right,” (2) “the interests at 
stake are germane to the organization’s purpose,” and (3) 
“neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires 
the participation of individual members’ in the lawsuit.”212 The 
organizations in the lawsuit had asserted the interest of 
protecting their members’ health, although the actual main 
purpose of the organization was to prevent animal cruelty.213 
  
 207 Although the court dismissed the Bison plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction under the APA, it held that all of the plaintiffs, including the animals, had 
Article III standing, but that the animals lacked statutory standing as the APA only 
applied to “person[s].” Levine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *45.  
 208 Id. at *14-31. John Does I and II were found to have Article III standing 
based on their allegations of physical and emotional injuries. Id. at *32.  
 209 Id. at *15 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998)). 
 210 Id. at *29. 
 211 Id. at *20-21. 
 212 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 
U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
 213 One of the organizational plaintiffs was permitted to continue because it 
stated that it was dedicated partly to consumer protection and human health. Levine, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *37-39. The court also found the challenged Notice to 
constitute a final agency action which was subject to judicial review. The Levine 
plaintiffs challenged the Notice under APA section 706(2), which provides that a court 
can “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions” that are 
“arbitrary” or “capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006). To be set aside under this 
section, an agency action must be discrete and final, and to be final, an action must “(1) 
‘mark the consummation of the agency’s decision making process’ and not be tentative, 
and (2) have legal consequences.’” Levine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *52 (citing 
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Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment to 
defendants, ruling that “Congress intended to exclude poultry 
from the categorical word ‘livestock.’”214 Plaintiffs appealed, and 
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision, 
remanding the case for the district court to dismiss based on 
the plaintiffs’ lack of Article III standing. The Ninth Circuit did 
not question the district court’s injury-in-fact analysis,215 but 
found instead that none of the plaintiffs could show that their 
alleged injury could be redressed by any ruling of the court. 
Because the HMSA had no enforcement mechanism, any 
decision of the court would have to be followed by a series of 
steps to reach the plaintiffs’ desired result of the use of more 
humane poultry slaughter methods, all of which steps were 
speculative. If the court ruled that the Notice was contrary to 
law and poultry should be included as “other livestock,” the 
Secretary would have to determine that poultry should fall 
under the FMIA’s umbrella, and then issue regulations for the 
humane slaughter of poultry. Furthermore, private processors 
would then have to follow these regulations. Because of the 
speculative nature of each of these steps, the court found the 
likelihood of relief to be too low to satisfy the redressability 
prong of Article III.216 
  
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)). The court determined that the Notice 
constituted final agency action. Id. at *61. 
  The court also ordered that the Levine plaintiffs show cause as to why the 
claims of the workers, EJC, and WNCWC should not be dismissed for improper venue. 
Id. at *65. 
 214 Levine v. Conner, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2008). It appears 
that the Levine individual plaintiffs—characterized by the court as “poultry eaters 
concerned about food-borne illness”—and the organizations representing the workers 
were the only plaintiffs left. Id. at 1113. 
 215 The absence of a discussion regarding injury-in-fact most likely shows that 
the Ninth Circuit accepts that a “credible” increase in risk suffices as injury-in-fact. In 
this regard, see also Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 
(9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer standing 
on plaintiffs; threatened injury constitutes ‘injury in fact.’”). 
 216 Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 988, 993-95, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). The 
redressability point was not as clear cut as the Ninth Circuit represented. The court 
concluded that the chain of events that would have to take place to remedy plaintiffs’ 
injury (the increased risk of foodborne illness) was too speculative to satisfy the Article III 
standing requirements, supposing that if the court construed “other livestock” to include 
poultry, the Secretary of Agriculture would still need to enforce the humane slaughter 
mechanisms in the FMIA and write regulations to do so. The court also noted that poultry 
processors would then have to adhere to the regulations. However, if one instead assumes 
that the Secretary will follow the legislative mechanism, then an inclusion of poultry in 
the HMSA humane slaughter mandate would lead inevitably to poultry’s inclusion in the 
FMIA, and the writing of regulations to govern its humane slaughter. Moreover, the 
inclusion of poultry in the definition of “other livestock” would surely relieve the injury to 
plaintiffs, which was the failure to include poultry in this definition, even if its ultimate 
effectiveness in ensuring humane slaughter requirements was delayed. See, e.g., 
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In Levine, the associational plaintiffs failed to satisfy 
the requirements for associational standing because the 
interest that they asserted was not germane to the 
organization’s purpose. However, had they asserted an interest 
in animal welfare, they may have failed to satisfy the 
prudential zone-of-interests standing test, as did the plaintiffs 
in the next case. 
3. The Zone-of-Interests Standing Requirement 
The zone-of-interests standing requirement appears to 
be a sticking point for the existing food-safety impact cases. 
This is only, however, because a significant portion of these 
cases thus far have been instigated by organizations such as 
animal welfare organizations or trade associations which have 
as their main purpose something other than food safety or 
consumer protection. The interests germane to these 
organizations’ purposes are not protected by the food-safety 
statutes. In Baur, Farm Sanctuary, with whom Michael Baur 
originally brought suit, was dismissed from the case because as 
an animal welfare organization, it could not assert an interest 
protected by the Federal Meat Inspection Act or the Federal 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.217 The Levine associational 
plaintiffs were dismissed because the interest they asserted in 
the lawsuit, the protection of their members’ health—which 
presumably they asserted because it fell under the zone of 
  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (“‘[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability 
requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to 
himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury’” (quoting 
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, n.15 (1982))). 
  The Ninth Circuit also commented that a district court need not take a 
plaintiff at her word at the motion-to-dismiss stage when determining the 
redressability prong of Article III standing—that this standard only applies to injury in 
fact and causation. Levine, 587 F.3d at 997 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 
  The court, however, did not discuss whether the standard for taking a 
plaintiff at her word at the motion-to-dismiss stage had changed since Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). It 
appears that the Ninth Circuit is now applying the Iqbal standard to 12(b)(1) subject 
matter jurisdiction challenges. See Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency 
Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
  Here, the Ninth Circuit explained that a plaintiff needed to plead facts 
showing the likelihood of redressability by pointing to earlier (1990, 1975) Supreme 
Court decisions, and without addressing Iqbal or Twombly, thereby implying that this 
had long been the case. By not discussing the district court’s injury-in-fact 
determination, the Ninth Circuit was therefore able to avoid discussing the possible 
effect Iqbal and Twombly would have on such an analysis. 
 217 Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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interests of the Federal Meat Inspection Act—was not germane 
to the purposes of their organization.218  
And, in 2005, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a claim by the 
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of 
America (R-CALF), a nonprofit organization representing United 
States cattle producers “on domestic and international trade and 
marketing issues [which] . . . is dedicated to ensuring the 
continued profitability and viability of the U.S. cattle industry”219 
under NEPA for a failure to satisfy the zone-of-interests 
prudential standing requirement. R-CALF had sued the USDA 
seeking to overturn the USDA’s decision to lift a ban on Canadian 
imports of most bovine meat for human consumption.220  
Until January 4, 2005, the USDA had banned the 
importation of all ruminants and ruminant products from 
countries in which BSE had been found, including Canada.221 
On that date, the USDA published a Final Rule relaxing the 
ban on the importation of Canadian ruminants. R-CALF sued 
to block the implementation of the Rule, arguing that it was 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA; that it violated NEPA 
because the agency had failed to make its environmental 
assessment public before publishing the Rule and had failed to 
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement; and that it 
violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) by failing to 
assess whether the Rule’s impact on small businesses could 
have been mitigated.222 
The district court agreed with plaintiffs on all counts, 
writing that the USDA had “preconceived intention, based 
upon inappropriate considerations, to rush to reopen the border 
regardless of uncertainties in the agency’s knowledge,” and had 
“attempted to work backwards to support and justify this 
  
 218 Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *38-39 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006). 
 219 About R-Calf USA; Working for the U.S. Cattle Industry, R-CALF USA, 
http://www.r-calfusa.com/about/about.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2011). 
 220 Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 221 As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[r]uminants are hoofed mammals 
generally defined by their four-chambered stomachs and their practice of chewing a cud 
consisting of regurgitated, partially digested food,” and “include cattle, sheep, goats, 
deer, giraffes, camels, llamas, and okapi.” Id. at 1084 n.1. 
 222 The RFA dates from 1980, and was passed “to ‘encourage administrative 
agencies to consider the potential impact of nascent federal regulations on small 
businesses.’” Id. at 1100 (quoting Assoc. Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 
111 (1st Cir. 1997)).  
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goal,”223 but the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, the court found 
that the district court had improperly substituted its judgment 
for that of the agency and had failed to defer properly to the 
agency’s determinations. The court found the USDA’s 
determination that the risks inherent in the Rule were both 
small and acceptable to be supported by an adequate 
administrative record.224 As to the RFA, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the USDA met RFA’s purely procedural requirements, by 
“conduct[ing] a detailed economic assessment of its proposed 
rule on small businesses.”225 
Regarding NEPA, the Ninth Circuit held that R-CALF 
did not have standing to pursue its claim under this statute.226 
NEPA, which prescribes the steps an agency must take before 
taking an action that will affect the environment, contains no 
private right of action or citizen-suit provision. A plaintiff suing 
for a NEPA violation must bring suit under the APA and must 
fall under the zone of interests protected by NEPA. Under 
Ninth Circuit law, a party seeking to sue for a NEPA violation 
must assert an environmental injury.227 R-CALF, however, 
exists to protect the economic interests of its members, and the 
injuries it asserted in its complaint were economic.228 Economic 
interests are not protected by NEPA, and R-CALF therefore 
lacked standing to bring its NEPA challenge. The Ninth Circuit 
remanded the case, and the district court granted summary 
judgment to the USDA.229 
4. Conclusion 
These cases, both in the abstract and as tools for future 
food-safety-impact litigation, teach three lessons. First, the 
  
 223 Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066, 1074 (D. Mont. 2005).  
 224 Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am., 415 
F.3d at 1100. 
 225 Id. at 1101. 
 226 Id. at 1103-04. 
 227 Id. at 1103 (citing Stratford v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 228 R-CALF also asserted that “R-CALF USA members will also be adversely 
affected by the increased risk of disease they face when Canadian beef enters the U.S. 
meat supply.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229 Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (D. Mont. 2005). The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, reminding R-CALF that it could not use post-decision evidence to show that 
the USDA had “rel[ied] on faulty assumptions,” but that it could use this new evidence 
to petition the USDA to reopen rulemaking under the APA. Ranchers Cattlemen Action 
Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1108, 1111, 1117-
18 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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standing challenges are navigable. At least the Ninth Circuit 
and the Second Circuit have shown themselves amenable to the 
allegation of an increased risk of contracting foodborne illness 
as a basis for injury in fact. Such a claim matches the purpose 
of the statutes that protect the safety of our food supply.  
Second, these cases illustrate the absence of a food-
safety-impact litigation culture. Two of these three cases were 
brought by animal welfare organizations, and one by a trade 
organization. Not one of the organizations spearheading this 
litigation had as its primary purpose the prevention, or 
minimization of foodborne illness, although they all alleged the 
increased risk of such as a basis for standing. Food-safety 
litigants, especially organizational litigants, must better 
negotiate the zone-of-interests test.  
And finally, in two of the three cases, the court found the 
plaintiffs’ use of the government’s own studies to show that the 
agency action would result in the alleged harm to be strong 
support for standing. The agency’s refusal to act in the face of its 
own studies lends support to the possibility that the agency’s 
final action was arbitrary and capricious, and allows a court to 
remain deferential to the agency, while ruling against it.  
C. Challenges to Judicial Review of Agency Action 
As described above, food-safety-impact litigation must 
be brought under the APA because the major food-safety 
statutes have neither citizen-suit provisions nor provide for 
private rights of action. Each case discussed above in the 
section on standing involved a challenge to agency action under 
the APA, for these very reasons, and in two, defendants 
challenged whether the agency action was reviewable under 
the APA. In Levine, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs 
had not challenged a final agency action, as is necessary for 
review under the APA, but the court disagreed.230 And in the R-
CALF case, the Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the 
district court had erred under the APA in its failure to defer to 
the agency’s expertise, and that the agency action was not, 
therefore, arbitrary and capricious.231  
  
 230 Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *10, *58-61 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006). 
 231 Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am., 415 
F.3d at 1100. 
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Another common232 challenge to the judicial 
reviewability of agency action in the food-safety context is the 
claim that the agency action at issue has been committed to 
agency discretion by law, and is therefore unreviewable under 
section 701(a)(2) of the APA.233 There are several categories of 
actions that the Supreme Court have found to fall under 
section 701(a)(2), and thus to be unreviewable, including “an 
agency’s decision not to institute enforcement proceedings,” “an 
agency’s refusal to grant reconsideration of an action because of 
material error,” and “the allocation of funds from a lump-sum 
appropriation.”234 In the following two cases, defendants claimed 
that the challenged agency action was an enforcement decision, 
and therefore unreviewable under the APA. In each of these 
cases, the court disagreed. Furthermore, both of these cases 
were actually successful in achieving their requested relief.  
Public Citizen v. Heckler was the impetus behind the 
federal government’s ban on the interstate sale of raw milk.235 
Public Citizen, a citizen advocacy organization, filed a citizen 
petition with the FDA in April of 1984, requesting that the 
agency prohibit the sale of unpasteurized milk.236 After no 
ruling was made, and the FDA refused to provide a schedule 
for a ruling, Public Citizen filed suit in September 1984 seeking 
a response to its petition. HHS held an informal hearing in 
October 1984 to solicit information on whether raw milk was a 
  
 232 “Common” insofar as this challenge was made in two of the fourteen cases found. 
 233 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006). 
 234 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1993) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 831 (1985); ICC v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 235 Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229 (D.D.C. 1987). Raw milk is milk 
that has not been pasteurized or homogenized. Before 1987, the federal government did 
not regulate the sale of raw milk, although many local and state governments did in 
some manner. The city of Chicago passed a mandatory milk pasteurization law in 1908, 
and in 1947, Michigan was the first state to do so. 
 236 Id. at 1231-33. In 1973, the Food and Drug Administration had 
promulgated a regulation prohibiting the sale of all unpasteurized milk products in 
interstate commerce, but, in 1974, this was stayed as to certified raw milk until the 
FDA could hold a hearing as to its safety. In re Revising Existing Standards and 
Establishing New Identity Standards for Milk and Cream, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,924 (Oct. 10, 
1973) (stayed in 39 Fed. Reg. 42,351 (Dec. 5, 1984)). “[C]ertified raw milk” satisfies 
standards established by the American Association of Medical Milk Commissions. Pub. 
Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1232.  
  The FDA collected information from 1974 to 1982, and in 1982, wrote a 
proposed regulation banning the interstate sale of all raw milk, based on the evidence 
that the consumption of raw milk was linked to bacterial disease. High-level officials at 
HHS and the CDC supported this regulation, and statistical support was provided by 
the Chief of the Bureau of Foods Epidemiology and Clinical Toxicology Division in 
1984. Id. at 1232-33. 
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public health concern and, if so, whether requiring 
pasteurization was the best solution. The evidence collected by 
the FDA, and the evidence introduced at the informal hearing 
“conclusively show[ed] . . . [that] raw milk is unsafe.”237  
After the district court ruled that the Department of 
Health and Human Services’ “justifications for delay were 
‘lame at best and irresponsible at worst,’” and ordered the 
Department to respond,238 the Department responded by 
denying Public Citizen’s petition for several reasons, including 
the following: (1) most raw milk was sold intrastate, (2) 
illnesses from raw milk stemmed mainly from intrastate 
commerce, and (3) banning interstate sales of raw milk would 
therefore have little effect on the public health.239 Public Citizen 
returned to district court to challenge the rule as arbitrary and 
capricious.240 
Defendant HHS challenged the reviewability of the 
petition’s denial, claiming that it was an enforcement decision, 
and thus fell under the section 701(a)(2) exception to 
reviewability. The court rejected this contention, explaining 
that “[h]ere the action at issue is not an individual enforcement 
action, but an agency’s refusal to engage in rulemaking.”241 
Furthermore, in Heckler v. Chaney, the case establishing the 
discretionary enforcement exception, the agency chose not to 
take an enforcement action against an entity, and there were 
no clear statutory guidelines for the court to interpret on when 
such actions should be taken. Here, on the other hand, HHS’s 
action could be reviewed with the clear statutory guidelines of 
the FFDCA and the Public Health Act as a guide.242  
The court then determined that the denial of Public 
Citizen’s petition was arbitrary and capricious. It found the 
explanation offered to be inconsistent with the evidence in 
front of the agency; that the documents before the court showed 
  
 237 Pub. Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1241. 
 238 Id. at 1234-35 (citing Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 613 
(D.D.C. 1985)).  
 239 Id. at 1235. The FDA’s other reasons were that milk sold interstate did not 
pose a greater risk than milk sold intrastate, that the FDA did not have the authority 
to prohibit intrastate sales, and that the problem was better dealt with by state and 
local governments anyway. Id. 
 240 Id. at 1231. 
 241 Id. at 1236 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 825 n.2 (1985)). This 
issue was settled in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“Refusals to 
promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is 
‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential’” (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & 
Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))). 
 242 Public Citizen, 602 F. Supp. at 1236. 
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that high level officials at the FDA and the CDC thought a ban 
on raw milk sales was a good idea, and indicated “a lack of 
rationality on the part of HHS in the decisionmaking process”; 
and that the reason given for the decision had “no rational 
connection to the undisputed facts in the record.”243 Pursuant to 
the court’s order, the FDA published a Final Rule banning the 
interstate sale of all raw milk and all raw milk products.244 
In Kenney v. Glickman, a number of individual 
plaintiffs,245 calling themselves “poultry consumers,” sued the 
USDA for discrepancies in the way that the USDA regulated 
poultry and meat.246 Plaintiffs argued that the USDA should 
either issue the same regulations for poultry and meat, or 
provide a “legally sufficient reason for treating meat and 
poultry differently.”247  
The Eighth Circuit rejected the USDA’s contention that 
the discrepancies between the meat and poultry inspection 
standards reflected an enforcement decision—that the agency 
had merely chosen to use agency resources to enforce meat 
inspections more rigorously. The standards at issue involved 
neither a decision about whether there had been a violation nor 
a refusal to institute proceeding, but were, instead, general 
  
 243 Id. at 1237, 1241.  
 244 21 C.F.R. § 1240.61 (2010); Memoranda from Milk Safety Branch on 
Sale/Consumption of Raw Milk to All Regional Food and Drug Directors (Mar. 19, 2003), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-SpecificInformation/MilkSafety/ 
CodedMemoranda/MemorandaofInformation/ucm079103.htm. 
 245 Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1118 (8th Cir. 1996). The original plaintiffs 
included red meat producers, who brought the case to remedy a perceived inequity in the 
USDA’s treatment of poultry and of beef, but the district court dismissed these plaintiffs for 
lack of standing. See Joe Roybal, Fighting for Fairness, BEEF MAG. (Nov. 1, 2000, 1:00 PM), 
http://beefmagazine.com/mag/beef_fighting_fairness/. The red meat producers did not 
appeal. See id. 
 246 Both the PPIA, which regulates poultry products, and the FMIA, which 
regulates meat, require that carcasses be inspected for the presence of certain 
contaminants that may cause the carcasses to be termed “adulterated,” and hence not 
allowed into the food supply. Kenney, 96 F.3d at 1121. Individual carcasses are 
inspected, and any contaminants are removed. Id. No contaminants are allowed to 
remain; there is a “zero tolerance” policy as to these contaminants on individual 
carcasses. Id. The contaminated parts must be removed from meat, while they may be 
washed off of poultry. Id. After the individual carcasses are inspected, an inspector 
then inspects sample carcasses from a particular lot to determine if there may be any 
process defects on that lot. Id. Until 1993, both the PPIA and the FMIA allowed a 
tolerance level of slightly more than zero for process defects, but in March 1993, the 
USDA lowered the tolerance level to zero for meat, but not for poultry. Id. 
 247 Id. 
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policies.248 The case did not, therefore, fall into the Heckler v. 
Chaney category of presumptively unreviewable cases.249 
The Court of Appeals also found that the prohibition 
against allowing adulterated products to enter the food supply 
provided a “sufficient standard” for the court to evaluate 
whether the USDA’s policies made sense.250 In addition, the 
court looked to the legislative history of the PPIA and the 
FMIA to determine that Congress intended for the two to be 
construed consistently. For this reason, there was sufficient 
law to apply to determine whether the USDA acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in implementing differing inspection 
standards for meat and poultry.251  
After remand, the district court found the discrepancy 
between meat and poultry regulation to be arbitrary and 
capricious,252 and in direct response to this decision—indeed, 
noting the decision in the background to the Final Rule—the 
FSIS harmonized the regulations.253  
Kenney and Public Citizen have three main implications. 
First, Heckler v. Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability does 
not apply to arbitrary and capricious challenges to the refusal to 
promulgate rules, which, in any event, was settled definitively 
by Massachusetts v. EPA.254 Second, if a petitioner presents 
evidence to support its allegations, the statutes governing food 
safety (including the FMIA, the PPIA, and the FFDCA) provide 
sufficient guidelines for a court to determine whether the 
relevant agency has acted reasonably. Third, a court is more 
likely to permit a case to go forward if petitioner’s evidence was 
produced by the relevant agency.255  
  
 248 Id. at 1123. 
 249 Id. One judge dissented in part, finding that the USDA’s regulations 
regarding tolerance standards for process defects and regarding the methods used to 
cleanse contaminants were enforcement actions, and were therefore presumptively 
unreviewable under Chaney. Id. at 1126 (McMillian, J., dissenting in part). 
 250 Id. at 1124 (majority opinion). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Roybal, supra note 245. The district court decision is unavailable. 
 253 See Retained Water in Raw Meat and Poultry Products; Poultry Chilling 
Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 1750, 1751-52 (Jan. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/97-054F.html. 
 254 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“Refusals to promulgate 
rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is ‘extremely limited’ 
and ‘highly deferential’” (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., 
Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))). 
 255 This has been a theme throughout the food-safety cases. The court relied 
on the government’s own documents to find standing in Baur, and in Levine as well, 
although that decision was overturned on other grounds. 
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D. Paths to Success in Food-Safety-Impact Litigation 
The upshot of the food-safety cases described above is 
that suits brought by food consumers or public health 
organizations alleging an increased risk of contracting 
foodborne illness because of an established governmental 
policy, and relying on the agency’s own documents, are likely to 
get into court. Specifically, these cases have four main 
implications for justiciability.  
First, courts seem to generally accept that the increase in 
risk of foodborne illness satisfies the Article III injury in fact 
standing requirement. This is noted with several caveats. One is 
that not every court is likely to accept such a claim. As discussed 
above, the D.C. Circuit would most likely look for a quantifiable 
increase in risk, and may even prohibit this category of claimant 
from litigating outside of the environmental context. The second 
caveat is that the cases discussed above were, for the most part, 
decided before the Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,256 which instructed district courts that 
a plaintiff needed factual allegations that “raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level,” and must “state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.”257 Lower courts are now grappling with 
the implications of applying this “plausibility standard” to 
determinations regarding challenges to subject matter 
jurisdiction, including standing challenges.258 This standard may 
make it more difficult for impact plaintiffs to progress beyond the 
motion-to-dismiss stage, although many will have been through 
the administrative petitioning process before filing a complaint, 
thus allowing them to gather information and evidence towards 
their complaint. Those plaintiffs who can accumulate more 
information before filing a complaint will fare better. 
The second lesson learned from the above discussion of 
justiciability relates to a plaintiff’s use of the relevant agency’s 
own documents and evidence to show that the potential harm 
from the agency action was significant. The Levine, Baur, 
Kenney, and Public Citizen courts found the fact that the 
agency’s own documents supported plaintiffs’ contentions (i.e., 
inhumanly slaughtered poultry are more likely to be carriers of 
  
 256 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007).  
 257 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.  
 258 See, e.g., Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 
711 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, No. CV 09-
357-SMM, 2010 WL 2926237 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2010). 
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communicable illness; downed cattle are more likely to have 
mad cow disease; the PPIA and the FMIA were meant to be 
construed similarly; FDA officials themselves acknowledged 
the danger of drinking raw milk) to be a compelling factor in 
allowing the case into court, and in the case of Public Citizen, 
to rule in favor of the plaintiff.  
Is this not a question for the merits? Yes, such 
documents ultimately go to whether the plaintiff has managed 
to show that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious. 
But the presence of such documents indicates to the court that 
the suit is neither futile nor frivolous; it speaks to an implicit 
likelihood of success inquiry. A court is required to defer to an 
agency’s reasonable construction of its regulations,259 and may 
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. This is even 
more important when a high level of technical expertise is 
implicated.260 Because judicial deference to agency decision 
making is so strong, a court must see a role for itself in the 
dispute, and a way to remain within its institutional 
competence before it allows plaintiffs into court. Documentary 
evidence of the relevant harm indicates that, whether through 
corruption, inefficiency, or sheer irrationality, the agency has 
acted against its own evidence and, in certain cases, its own 
directives. Moreover, such documents show that the agency 
was not acting pursuant to internal management 
considerations or other factors that a court should have no 
hand in administering.261 
The use of an agency’s own documents by petitioners 
does not, however, guarantee success on the merits. For 
example, in the R-CALF case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs, 
  
 259 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 260 Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. 
Dep’t of Agric., No. 05-35264, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17360, at *32 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 
2005). Similarly, in Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the D.C. Circuit 
dismissed a citizen-suit challenge to the FDA’s decision to list a color additive, Blue No. 2 
dye, as safe for human consumption. Public Citizen, the Center for Science in the Public 
Interest, and a private citizen alleged that the FDA’s studies on the dye had been 
improperly done. The court explained that it was compelled to “uphold the FDA’s decision 
if it reveals that significant evidence on both sides of the question has been considered 
and that the agency has explained its conclusions in light of significant objections.” Id. at 
1434. Deference to the agency’s judgment was particularly important in cases involving 
“sophisticated scientific judgment,” as was this one. Id. And in Public Citizen v. Foreman, 
631 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1980), discussed supra note 162, the D.C. Circuit dismissed 
Public Citizen’s challenge to the FDA’s determination that nitrites were sanctioned as a 
preservative prior to 1958, and therefore qualified for an exemption from the FFDCA, 
finding that it must defer to the agency’s technical expertise.  
 261 Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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explaining that the district court had failed to sufficiently defer 
to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.262 The appeals 
court noted that the district court had erred by “analyzing each 
protective component of the regulatory system in isolation,” 
instead of “evaluat[ing] the cumulative effects of the multiple, 
interlocking safeguards.”263 
Third, an organizational plaintiff must be able to show 
that the interests at stake in the lawsuit are germane to the 
organization’s purpose and that the interests asserted fall under 
the zone of interests protected by the statute. This was an issue 
with the animal welfare organizations in Levine, which could not 
show that that an interest in consumer health, as put forward in 
this lawsuit, was germane to their purposes;264 with R-CALF, 
which could not show environmental injury so as to have 
standing under NEPA;265 in Baur, when Farm Sanctuary was 
dismissed from the case;266 and in Kenney, where the red-meat 
producers did not survive a motion to dismiss.267 
This barrier is less likely to stand in the way of 
environmental plaintiffs. In the first place, the citizen-suit 
provisions arguably negate the zone-of-interests test altogether.268 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, there is a well-organized 
environmental impact plaintiff movement. Nothing similar exists 
in the food-safety world. The inclusion of citizen-suit provisions in 
the environmental laws was partially a function of the existence 
of the environmental protection movement. Legislators, with the 
help of individuals from these organizations, recognized a 
beneficial symbiosis between the fledgling EPA and the efforts of 
these organizations to enforce and strengthen regulation. In a 
sense, several of these organizations, through a push and pull, 
became extra eyes, ears, and arms of the government in enforcing 
environmental protection.269 
Because there are fewer litigating public health 
organizations, food-safety litigation may be brought ostensibly 
for public health, but actually for other purposes, such as the 
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956 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
humane treatment of animals, or the economic interests of 
cattle producers—hence the associational standing and zone-of-
interests problem commonly faced by food-safety-impact 
litigants. Of course, if an organization brings suit alongside a 
consumer or two, the consumer may have standing even if the 
organizational plaintiff does not. The suit can therefore go 
forward, and the stated goal of the organization in the suit may 
still be reached. Other goals, however, such as publicity for the 
issue, and for the organization, may not be forthcoming in such 
a suit. And in certain cases, increased public awareness is more 
important than achievement of the suit’s sought relief. 
Moreover, it is publicity that raises the profile of the 
organization bringing the suit, lends legitimacy to its 
enterprise, and teaches the public that this is an issue worthy 
of donating money.  
Fourth, and finally, courts are more likely to grant 
access if the stated injury stems from a present governmental 
policy—for example, the policy of allowing “downed” cattle to 
enter the food supply.270 This element speaks to the injury-in-
fact prong of the Article III standing analysis as well as the 
redressability prong—no third party has to act for the injury to 
take place, nor would a third party need to act for the 
requested relief to take place.271  
CONCLUSION 
Food-safety-impact cases are few and far between, but 
there is no compelling reason for this to remain the case. The 
absence of citizen-suit provisions in the food-safety statutes 
does not foreclose citizen suits. Food-safety-impact litigation 
brought by individuals or groups able to show that they or their 
members are at increased risk of contracting foodborne illness 
as a result of a final agency action, ideally by pointing to 
evidence in the relevant agency’s own documents, is likely to 
make it past constitutional and prudential standing challenges. 
Moreover, it is entirely within the competence of the judiciary 
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to assess whether there has been arbitrary and capricious 
action taken in the food-safety context. 
Overseeing food safety in this country is an enormous job, 
and agency oversight of food safety is, and will likely continue to 
be, severely underfunded. There are numerous food-safety areas 
where agency decision making has stalled, either from a lack of 
resources or from industry pressure. Such inertia is detrimental 
to the public health. Citizen litigation can act as a counterpart to 
governmental regulation, pushing agencies to fulfill their 
statutory mandates, and making judicial review of agency 
decision making regarding food-safety regulation a valuable tool 
in reducing the incidence of foodborne illness. 
